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BENJAMIN A. KAHN*
A Place Called Home: Native
Sovereignty Through Statehood and
Political Participation
ABSTRACT
This article addresses the efforts of American Indians and the
Maori in New Zealand to resolve natural resource disputes and pre-
serve sovereignty through statehood movements and other forms of
political participation. This is the third installment in a series pub-
lished by Stanford University and the University of California Da-
vis1 on the efforts of indigenous people to maintain control over
sovereignty and natural resources through a variety of legal coping
strategies.
This article analyzes the history of indigenous participation
in imported political frameworks in the United States and New Zea-
land, and concludes that both American Indians and the Maori have
attempted to mirror, or otherwise participate in, imported legal con-
structs to maintain some semblance of sovereignty and control over
their natural resources. Although direct participation in the domi-
nant legal and political model is one way of combating erosions in
native sovereignty and natural resource control, the article concludes
that indigenous people at times will need to adapt to imported colo-
nial norms through other efforts as well.
* Benjamin A. Kahn is a graduate of Tufts University and the University of Michigan
Law School. Mr. Kahn clerked for Justice George Lohr on the Colorado Supreme Court,
was a Bates Fellow, and has focused his scholarly work on Indian law and natural resource
issues. Mr. Kahn was an equity partner in an AmJur 250 law firm and is one of the
founding partners of the Conundrum Group, LLP. The Group is based in the Colorado
communities of Aspen, Breckenridge, Gunnison and Salida. Mr. Kahn’s practice focuses on
business, real estate and natural resource matters in the West. See www.conundrumlaw.
com. A forth installment in the series is being published by the University of Oklahoma.
1. Benjamin A. Kahn, The Legal Framework Surrounding Maori Claims to Water Resources
in New Zealand: In Contrast to the American Indian Experience, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 49, 50–52
nn.6–15 (1999) [hereinafter Kahn, Legal Framework]; Benjamin A. Kahn, Separate and Unequal:
Environmental Regulatory Management on Indian Reservations, 35 ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 203–29
(2012) [hereinafter Kahn, Separate and Unequal]. A fourth installment in the series is being
published by the University of Oklahoma: Benjamin A. Kahn, Sword or Submission: Amer-
ican Indian Natural Resource Claims Settlement Legislation, 37 Am. Indian L. Rev. 109
(2012–2013).
1
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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between indigenous peoples and European set-
tlers are typically framed as the byproducts of expansion, benevolent
philanthropy, divine religious inspiration, global exploration, paternal
supervision, or other justifications devoid of malicious intent.2 In con-
trast, a more critical group of scholars protests that such apologist ratio-
nale is nothing more than myths and mirrors obscuring a malicious plan
to dominate and destroy indigenous culture.3
A third approach avoids both ideological extremes, and instead is
built on bread and butter economics. In particular, natural resources
translate into money that allow for raw survival. While the relationship
between indigenous peoples and subsequent settlers consistently re-
volves around an economic battle for control over natural resources, con-
trol over those natural resources is vital to the continuing existence of
indigenous communities.4 I previously applied these assumptions with
respect to treaty rights and natural resource allocation issues, i.e., divid-
ing the pie and deciding who gets what.5 I subsequently applied these
assumptions to statutory, fiduciary and constitutional rights in the con-
text of natural resource protection, i.e., environmental quality concerns.6
This article, in turn, applies these assumptions in the context of natural
resource control and direct political participation in dominant imported
norms by indigenous people.
Possession of land is crucial to the survival of independent indige-
nous nations. It allows for self-determination over matters of internal ju-
risdiction and rights to secure, manage, and develop a sustainable
2. See, e.g., AUGIE FLERAS & JEAN LEONARD ELLIOTT, THE NATIONS WITHIN: ABORIGI-
NAL-STATE RELATIONS IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND NEW ZEALAND 3–4 (1992); VINE
DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
85, 89, 92–94 (1974); OREN R. LYONS ET AL., EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY,
INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 3 (1992); R. David Edmunds, National Expan-
sion from the Indian Perspective, in INDIANS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 159 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed.,
1988).
3. See, e.g., FLERAS & ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 3; FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF R
AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 5–8 (1975); CAROL ARCHIE,
MAORI SOVEREIGNTY: THE PAKEHA PERSPECTIVE 145 (1995) (interview with Steven Young);
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (2011) (“The Colo-
nists required the creation of legal and political relationships with the tribes in order to
legitimate land transactions”); LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE
LIMITS OF THE LAW 5 (1991) (“Euro-Americans originally used the law in combination with
military might to strip indigenous peoples of most of their natural resources.”).
4. See, e.g., Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 1; Kahn, Separate and Unequal, supra R
note 1. R
5. Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 1. R
6. Kahn, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1. R
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internal economic base.7 Land provides natural boundaries and access to
precious natural resources such as oil, gas, and metals. Indeed, oppo-
nents of Indian sovereignty often rationalize their position by pointing to
small tribal land base holdings.8 The importance of control over natural
resources applies to other holdings like water as well, given that water is
crucial to sustaining life.9
Rights to natural resources are a basis for both economic power
and raw survival; therefor it is no surprise that relations between indige-
nous peoples and settlers largely revolve around a struggle for control
over those resources. It also seems obvious that control over such natural
resources is vital to the continuing existence of communities that strive
for independent political representation and economic sustainability.10
If indeed the history of interactions between indigenous peoples
and subsequent settlers represents a battle for control over natural re-
sources—and control over those resources is critical to both economic
and political power—then these assumptions generate some startling
conclusions. Indeed, the formal mechanisms of imported governmental
and legal frameworks often systemically parrot settler goals of control-
ling natural resources.11 These legal frameworks usually reflect the domi-
nant governments’ policy goal of assuming control and proprietary
rights over natural resources that were previously under indigenous tri-
bal dominion.12 Different governments attempt to gain control over in-
digenous held natural resources with different methods. However, all of
those efforts depend on the legitimacy of imported legal frameworks like
7. FLERAS & ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 2 (“Land is the economic bedrock for the renewal R
of aboriginal peoples as a distinct society or nation.”); DELORIA, supra note 2, at 178; R
Whaimutu Dewes, Fisheries—A Case Study of an Outcome, in TREATY SETTLEMENTS: THE UN-
FINISHED BUSINESS 134 (Geoff McLay ed., 1995) (Natural resources and knowledge “set the
upper bounds on economic development.”).
8. DELORIA, supra note 2, at 163, 165. R
9. Water: The Power, Promise, and Turmoil of North America’s Fresh Water, NAT’L GEO-
GRAPHIC Nov. 1993, at 18–36; Water: Our Thirsty World, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC April 2010, at
36–59.
10. Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of
the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 375, 393 (1991); see also BURTON, supra note 3, at 18; R
DELORIA, supra note 2, at 110. R
11. Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 1. R
12. Id.; see also JAMES EDWARD FITZGERALD, THE NATIVE POLICY OF NEW ZEALAND: A
SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF NEW ZEALAND 32 (1862) (“[A] great
part of [the Maori] mistrust these [legal, governmental, and political] institutions you are
inventing for them—and it is natural that they should mistrust institutions which they
suppose are invented for our benefit, not for theirs. Should we not think exactly the same in
their place?”).
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contracts, treaties, constitutions, or statutes to support what often boils
down to just a pure natural resource grab.13
When it comes to allocating natural resources, settlers have used
the law they bring from afar to document and justify their division of
economic assets previously under indigenous control.14 When indige-
nous people find that natural resource rights are subject to imported le-
gal norms and allocation schemes, they must develop coping and
protection strategies to deal with the foreign constructs. In the context of
resource allocation, this generally has taken the form of a written con-
tract or treaty that defines, allocates, and divides natural resource
rights.15 For example, indigenous people have had to adapt to the im-
ported concept of individual natural resource ownership rights in the
face of tension with historic communal ownership norms. With respect
to natural resource protection, tribes have statutory, fiduciary, and con-
stitutional rights at their disposal to enforce the same environmental reg-
ulatory protection afforded to those outside of reservation boundaries.16
Absent adequate protection, tribes can turn to the judicial system and
sue for their environmental quality and equality.17 However, all of these
protections and enforcement options are legal mechanisms imposed
upon indigenous people. One approach to enforce indigenous natural
resource rights therefor is to work within the system by using dominant
imported legal parameters as both a shield and sword in the battle for
natural resource control and protection.18
Like all of my work, this article depends on two basic premises:
(1) that the history of relationships between indigenous peoples and sub-
sequent settlers largely represents a battle for control over natural re-
sources; and (2) that control over natural resources is a foundation for
both economic and political self-sufficiency. Because the relationship be-
tween indigenous people and the dominant governments revolves
around fights to possess or control valuable natural resources, indige-
nous people explore and employ a variety of legal survival strategies.
This article explores a wholly different approach for the indige-
nous quest to maintain control over native natural resources. In addition
to working within the foreign system through contract or lawsuit, indig-
enous people have at times mimicked, mirrored, or directly participated
in the imported legal construct in an effort to maintain the political and
13. See, e.g., Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 1; see also FITZGERALD, supra note 12, R
at 32 (1862); Tamihana Korokai v. Solicitor-General [1912] 32 NZLR 321 (CA), 333.
14. Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 1. R
15. Id.
16. Kahn, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1. R
17. Id.
18. Id.; Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 1. R
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economic independence critical to natural resource control. While these
coping strategies reflect a certain acquiescence to the dominant political
model, they are options for indigenous people to advance their own in-
terests in the face of a stacked political deck. Indeed, both American In-
dian and Maori communities have sought to maintain sovereignty
through formal statehood movements or other direct participation
within the dominant political framework. The article focuses on five par-
ticular Indian tribes, because they were the communities primarily in-
volved in statehood debates framed by the federal political system in the
United States. The article contrasts the experiences of these Indian tribes
with that of the Maori in New Zealand, because the Maori represent an
example in the monarchy and parliamentary contexts.
Part II addresses how American Indian tribes have at times em-
braced the imported European political model in response to encroach-
ments on Indian land and sovereignty from immigrants’ thirst for Indian
natural resource holdings. Indeed, even as the federal government forci-
bly removed Indian tribes from their homelands and carved up collec-
tive tribal resource holdings for individual allotments, these tribes
sought statehood status within the federal system in an effort to preserve
their self-determination. When efforts geared toward establishing a pan-
Indian state failed, Indian nations advocated for tribal sovereignty
within the federal system, formed independent legislative entities, and
exercised the right to vote and hold office instead. These, and other cop-
ing strategies, have allowed Indian tribes to use the dominant political
system to advance tribal interests, including Indian sovereignty and con-
trol over natural resources.
Part III compares the American Indian experience in adapting to
dominant political norms to that of the Maori in New Zealand. Doing so
underscores the common experience that indigenous people face when a
foreign governmental construct is imposed by immigrants and settlers.
Faced with either absolute resistance or adaptation, indigenous people—
like the American Indians and the Maori—are resourceful, and quickly
find ways to emulate or participate in the imported legal framework. The
Maori have relied on a variety of survival strategies to protect native
sovereignty and natural resource holdings, including the creation of par-
allel governmental bodies modeled after western applications, the utili-
zation of voting rights, and the development of dedicated political
parties. Each time, these efforts reflect in part Maori concerns over the
allocation of natural resources.
This article concludes that the American Indian and Maori exper-
iences with imported legal norms underscore the fundamental connec-
tion between preserving indigenous sovereignty and protecting native
natural resource holdings. Ultimately, indigenous people will do what
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they need to do to survive and compete effectively within a system of
new rules. To protect their own natural resources and goal of self-deter-
mination, indigenous people size up imported governmental and legal
systems, and quickly find ways to adapt and advance their interests. This
article demonstrates that direct political participation is one effective
way that indigenous people have worked within the system to accom-
plish native sovereignty and natural resource objectives, but it is also just
one arrow in the quiver.
II. AMERICAN INDIAN EMBRACE OF THE EUROPEAN MODEL
Long before European immigrants set foot on what is now the
United States of America, Indian tribal communities existed as sovereign
and independent nations. One of the foremost indicators of a secure sta-
tus of sovereignty is self-determination, i.e., internal control over the po-
litical, social, economic, and natural resources of a community.19 When
immigrant pressure for natural resources grew, settlers and colonial gov-
ernments increasingly threatened Indian nations’ status as independent
and sovereign communities. In several instances, immigrant pressure for
natural resources led to statehood proposals for American Indian com-
munities or other forms of direct political participation.
Although statehood within the United States federal system rep-
resents a dramatic diminishment of sovereignty for Indian nations, such
proposals served as compromise measures for American Indian commu-
nities that wished to salvage their independent status in the face of an
overwhelming influx of immigrants. The Okmulgee Council, the Com-
mission to the Five Civilized Tribes, and the Sequoyeh Convention in-
volved three formal proposals for a pan-Indian State.20 All three of these
proposals primarily involved the five “civilized” tribes—the Creek,
Chickasaw, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Seminole (the “Five Tribes”). These
three proposals for a pan-Indian state surfaced one by one from the Civil
War era until the 1907 admittance of Oklahoma as a state. An examina-
tion of these proposals provides a telling glimpse of American Indian
nations’ offensive and defensive survival strategies in the face of immi-
grant pressure on native sovereignty and natural resources.
19. Webster’s Dictionary defines self-determination in part as “Freedom of the people
of a given area to choose their own political status.” WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY
1001 (1995).
20. See infra Part II.
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A. Immigrant Pressure Prior to 1830
The Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Seminole nations
carried the title of “civilized” tribes because there was a large degree of
intermarriage between tribal members and the outside community.21 The
federal Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes referred to this in its
1904 report, asserting that these tribal members were “Indians only in
name.”22 Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Seminole lands
originally covered virtually the entire southeast area of the United
States.23 However, statehood proposals for the American Indian commu-
nity revolved around land that the Five Tribes occupied after their re-
moval from eastern lands in the 1830s, in what is now the State of
Oklahoma.24
The first treaties that Congress signed with the Five Tribes in-
cluded a clause stating that “at no time” would the Indian Territory fall
within the bounds of state control.25 This official policy implied a tribal
right to political status outside that of any state jurisdiction. Therefore
the Five Tribes initially appeared willing to make peace with the immi-
grants, as long as the United States guaranteed the tribes’ status as sover-
eign nations.
Despite the treaty guarantees, the newly formed United States
harbored a taste for the natural resources controlled by the Five Tribes
and other Indian nations. The pan-Indian statehood proposals that later
emerged stemmed from the correlation between immigrant pressure for
natural resources and attacks on tribal sovereignty. The history of federal
21. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1904, 7–8 (1904) [hereinafter CFCT 1904].
22. Id. Among the Five Tribes there are a few additional misnomers. The Creeks were
the largest division of Muskhogeans and approximately half of the Creek community
spoke Muscogee. Id. The Creek name came from the first British immigrants who renamed
the Muskhogeans based on the numerous streams in the area. U.S. CONGRESS, REPORT WITH
RESPECT TO THE HOUSE RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R. REP. NO.
82-2503, 333 (1953) (at least five other languages were spoken in the community since 1730).
The Seminoles were Muskhogeans and had emigrated from Creek lands to Florida soon
after 1700. GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES OF INDIANS 315 (1953). By 1775, these Muskhogeans became the Seminoles, which
translates into separatist or runaway. Id.
23. U.S. CONGRESS, REPORT WITH RESPECT TO THE HOUSE RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE BU-
REAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R. Rep. No. 82-2503, maps 10, 12, 16, 18, & 59 (1953).
24. See infra Part II.B.2, II.C, II.D, & II.E.
25. Bert Hodges, Notes on the History of the Creek Nation and Some of Its Leaders, 43
CHRON. OKLA., no.1, 1965, at 15.
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and tribal interactions before the 1830 removal of the Five Tribes under-
scores this connection.
1. From Assimilation to Removal
Federal Indian policies in the 1780s relied on gradual cultural as-
similation to achieve the goal of incorporation, formulated as the only
alternative to war with the Indian communities.26 Such a forceful re-
moval was far too great an expense for the newly born United States to
tackle.27
Thomas Jefferson formally initiated the idea of encroachment on
tribal lands by suggesting the removal of the Five Tribes to western
lands.28 Jefferson proposed removal as the only solution to protect the
Indians from mass genocide resulting from immigrant pressure for land
and other natural resources.29 In 1803, President Jefferson proposed a
constitutional amendment allowing Indians and whites to trade eastern
land for western land.30 Congress never seriously considered this propo-
sal, as the tribes were still a formidable military foe.31
However, the new nation was growing in size and population
quickly, as was the immigrant appetite for Indian natural resources. In
1801, the federal government began to build a road on Choctaw land to
deliver mail.32 This was the first sign that the new nation desperately
needed the land and resources of the Five Tribes to continue to expand
and prosper. In addition, small scale farmers in the Southeast were pres-
suring the federal government to secure the fertile lands of the Five
Tribes.33 An alliance therefore emerged in the early 1800s between immi-
grant farmers and federal leaders based on shared beliefs that the
Choctaws were wasting prime farmland and that a larger white popula-
tion would help secure the recently won territory against Spanish ambi-
tion.34 The state of Georgia was most impatient to develop natural
resources because it was the last of the original thirteen colonies to
26. Samuel J. Wells, Federal Indian Policy, in THE CHOCTAW BEFORE REMOVAL 181, 184
(Carolyn Keller Reeves, ed., 1985).
27. WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 34 (1986).
28. Arthur H. DeRosier Jr., Thomas Jefferson and the Removal of the Choctaw Indians, 1
S.Q., no. 1, 1962, at 52.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 27. R
32. John A. Watkins, The Choctaws in Mississippi, in A CHOCTAW SOURCE BOOK 71
(1985).
33. See Wells, supra note 26, at 187. R
34. See Wells, supra note 26, at 192–93. R
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emerge and therefore felt insecure as a buffer between the United States
and Spanish territories.35
In 1802, Georgia signed a compact with the federal government
that called for the removal of Indians, including the Cherokees within
Georgia, in exchange for Georgian western land claims.36 Thus the first
concrete indication that the federal government would infringe on the
sovereignty of Indian nations, and pursue western removal with an eye
on the Five Tribes’ natural resources, emerged from the more abstracted
Jeffersonian philosophy.
2. Immigrant Encroachment
Thousands of new settlers and immigrants responded to removal
rumors, and illegally moved to Cherokee lands in Tennessee and Geor-
gia in 1809 to 1810.37 These immigrants hoped to squat and establish pre-
emptive rights to Cherokee land and natural resources.38 In addition, by
1810 the federal government was in desperate need of more roads for
postal purposes to connect Mississippi and New Orleans with northeast
towns.39 In 1815, for example, future President Andrew Jackson oversaw
the construction of a military road on Mississippi Choctaw land.40 By
1814, states surrounded the Creeks and Cherokee and those tribes be-
came communities isolated from other Indian nations.41 Between 1814
and 1816, the market price of cotton doubled and the demand for land of
the Five Tribes reached a feverish pitch.42 Increasing immigrant en-
croachment led to the first Seminole War from 1816 to 1818.43 As Missis-
sippi gained statehood in 1817, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun’s
responsibilities included relations with the Indian nations, and he out-
lined a new official federal Indian policy: the first step was to eliminate
independent Indian nations so that the federal government could control
and protect the territories, and the second step was to relegate the Indian
nations to a “more reasonable” territory.44
35. DALE VAN EVERY, DISINHERITED: THE LOST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 9
(1966).
36. Francis Paul Prucha, introduction to JEREMIAH EVARTS, CHEROKEE REMOVAL: THE
“WILLIAM PENN” ESSAYS AND OTHER WRITINGS 3 (1981).
37. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 27, at 154. R
38. Id.
39. Wells, supra note 26, at 188. R
40. Id. at 193.
41. MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POLITICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT AND
SOCIETY IN CRISIS 42 (1982).
42. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 27, at 207. R
43. See DeRosier Jr., supra note 28, at 52. R
44. Id.
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Immigrants and their offspring had grown so much in population
by 1820 that Indian removal from the Southeast was a major issue.45
More settlers were moving to the Southeast driven by the demand for
natural resources; for example, miners discovered gold in Georgia, lead-
ing 10,000 prospectors to intrude upon Cherokee land to lay mining
claims.46 Scholar Francis Prucha describes encroachment on the Five
Tribes during the 1820s as an “expanding plantation system [that] began
its sweep across the Gulf Plains and the impatient whites found the en-
claves of Indian lands an unacceptable hindrance.”47 In 1827, Georgian
surveyors, citizens, and squatters disrupted and displaced Creek re-
sidents while government agents attempted to recruit Indians west.48 In-
deed, increasing population and military strength led immigrants in the
Southeast to become aggressive in their demand for Indian removal.49
Early in 1827, however, Creeks still owned nearly 200,000 acres in
Georgia.50
The Treaties of Washington and Fort Mitchell soon called for the
surrender of all Creek land in Georgia by January 1, 1827.51 This reduced
Creek land holdings to five million acres in Alabama.52 Large groups of
exploitative traders, speculators, and whiskey sellers encouraged Creeks
to remain in the area, while others continued to demand removal.53
The Five Tribes had limited alternatives. Without the unity and
power to fight off unwelcome immigrants, the Five Tribes effectively
faced a choice of eventual removal or genocide. Historian Arthur DeRo-
sier summarizes the period from 1786 to 1825 as one of declining land
and natural resources for the Five Tribes:
At times, the Choctaw readily acquiesced in an effort to pacify
their land-hungry and aggressive neighbors; at other times,
they had to be pressured into negotiations to rectify boundary
45. Id.
46. B. NARASINGARAJAN, STAND WATIE: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY 4 (1984).
47. Prucha, supra note 36, at 3. R
48. GREEN, supra note 41, at 130. R
49. See VAN EVERY, supra note 35, at 8 (“[T]he white borderer had learned to regard R
them as fools, drunkards, demoniac enemies, wretches of sub-human depravity, whose
existence constituted an intolerable nuisance which could only be abated by
extermination.”).
50. GREEN, supra note 41, at 130. R
51. Treaty of Washington, art. 12, U.S.-Creek Nation, Jan. 24, 1826, available at http://
georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/washing2.htm.
52. GREEN, supra note 41, at 141. R
53. GREEN, supra note 41, at 149 (“Outside. . . sat the settlers of Alabama and Georgia, R
like vultures on a fence rail, waiting hungrily for the Nation [Creek] to crumble so they
could swoop down and claim the remains—the eastern extremity of the Alabama Black
Belt.”).
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disputes or pay off overdue commercial debts. Either way the
end result was the same; the Choctaw Nation slowly but
surely decreased in size. . ..54
As the pressure for removal reached a climax, the relationship be-
tween diminished native sovereignty and immigrant desire for the Five
Tribes’ resources crystallized. Faced with a mass taking of their entire
land base, the continued existence of the Five Tribes as independent na-
tions hung in the balance.
B. Uncertain Tribal Nations—From Removal to Civil War
In the years leading up to removal, there was a growing chorus to
move all Indian tribes west where the federal government could more
effectively govern them or tribes could take control of their own govern-
ment.55 Although no specific removal policy existed, a series of treaties
with the Five Tribes had already diminished or altered native land
boundaries.56 Immigrant and Indian representatives signed many of
these treaties, including nine with the Cherokees, six with the Creeks,
four with the Choctaws, three with the Chickasaws, and one with the
Seminoles.57
The foreshadow of a removal policy was present in dealings be-
tween the federal government and the Five Tribes before 1830, however,
and by 1830 the federal government was secure enough to begin an am-
bitious and explicit campaign for eastern Indian natural resources.58 Dur-
ing this time, settlers remained eager to gain control over the land of the
Five Tribes.59
1. The Official Removal Policy
The election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency in 1828 was the
final piece of the puzzle necessary to implement an official removal pol-
icy. When Jackson arrived in office, removal advocates felt that it was
54. Arthur H. DeRosier Jr., The Choctaw Removal of 1831: A Civilian Effort, J. WEST, 1967,
at 237.
55. JEREMIAH EVARTS, A Brief View, in CHEROKEE REMOVAL: THE “WILLIAM PENN” ES-
SAYS AND OTHER WRITINGS 200, 208 (Francis Paul Prucha, ed., 1981).
56. FOREMAN, supra note 22, at 19. R
57. Id.
58. VAN EVERY, supra note 35, at 106 (“No longer was there a need to take into account R
the resistance either of Indians or of foreign powers with whom they had so often been
allied. The United States had reached a position of strength which made any disposition of
the Indians dependent solely upon its own will.”).
59. Id.
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their “hour of triumph.”60 After all, Jackson was a citizen of Tennessee
and a large land speculator himself.61 Jackson also was a military vet-
eran, had previously been involved with Southeast Indian treaty negotia-
tions, and by 1828 was, by one historian’s account, “the outstanding
exponent of the white man’s relentless contest for the lands of the In-
dian.”62 As such, Jackson was eager to begin removing the Five Tribes.63
Once Jackson was President, the state of Georgia declared juris-
diction over all Indian lands within its boundaries and Mississippi did so
as well in 1829.64 Members of the Five Tribes faced the reality that once
Congress approved of the states’ actions, local Indians either had to
move off their land or live without tribal organization and subject to
state jurisdiction.65 At this point, the immigrant land of the Five Tribes
had grown to a point where removal was all but inevitable.66
Despite the cresting demand for removal of the Five Tribes, there
were individuals that lobbied against such infringements on native sov-
ereignty. Jeremiah Evarts wrote during this time, under the pseudonym
William Penn, that there were 60,000 Indians in the Southeast who
would be forced to make the long removal journey (out of a national
Indian population of 300,000 to 500,000).67 The United States Secretary of
War estimated higher, placing the population of the Five Tribes alone
over the 75,000 individual mark.68 Evarts understood the correlation be-
tween infringements on native sovereignty and the immigrant demand
for Indian natural resources, as exemplified in a letter he and other
prominent Massachusetts residents wrote to Congress in February of
1830:
60. R.S. COTTERILL, THE SOUTHERN INDIANS: THE STORY OF THE CIVILIZED TRIBES BEFORE
REMOVAL 237 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1954).
61. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 27, at 207. R
62. FOREMAN, supra note 22, at 21. R
63. Arthur H. DeRosier Jr., Andrew Jackson and Negotiations for the Removal of the Choc-
taw Indians, 29 HISTORIAN, no. 3, 343, 344 (1967) (“If the goal is the removal of Indians from
the splendid farm lands of the Ohio, Tennessee, and Mississippi valleys, Jackson reasoned,
then let us quit philosophizing and procrastinating and do the job as quickly and painlessly
as possible.”).
64. Id. at 346.
65. COTTERILL, supra note 60, at 239. R
66. VAN EVERY, supra note 35, at 9 (The Five Tribes “had been inundated by a cataclys- R
mic wave of overwhelmingly superior force and numbers.”).
67. JEREMIAH EVARTS, Essays on the Present Crisis in the Condition of the American Indians,
in CHEROKEE REMOVAL, supra note 55, at 43, 48 (The source states “Southwest” because the R
United States had not expanded west at the time of the writing. It has been changed for
clarity.).
68. Id.
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It would seem impossible to assign them [Indians] any place,
where they will not stand in the way of the whites; and where
the supposed interests of the whites would not be promoted
by their removal, or their extinction.69
Other anti-removal advocates, such as Boston resident William
Reed, concentrated their protests on the destitute conditions awaiting the
Five Tribes in the West. In 1831, Reed wrote that proposed removal lands
were almost completely composed of prairie, devoid of any wood except
for very mountainous areas, without running water in the winter
months, and that before removal the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations
already had appropriated all of the decent land in the area.70 Besides con-
cerned citizens such as Reed, many northern Congressmen opposed the
removal plan because they were wary of an increased southern electorate
base.71
Nevertheless, the removal proposal passed through Congress and
became official federal policy.72 One scholar even contends that President
Jackson and federal officials were overly eager to help restless white set-
tlers begin the removal process:
Indians were called into councils and gorged with pork and
beef and plied with whisky; chiefs, warriors, and other influ-
ential men of the tribes by argument, persuasion, cajolery,
threats, or bribes, the means depending on the exigencies of
the occasion, were induced to agree to terms set down on pa-
per called treaties. Indian removal by the government was
thus formally inaugurated.73
In 1832, the Paynes Landing Treaty called for the completion of
Seminole removal within three years.74 Dissension within the tribe re-
sulted in the Second Seminole War from 1835 to 1842, costing the federal
government twenty million dollars and 1,500 American lives.75 After
gold surfaced within Cherokee limits in Georgia, the New Echota Treaty
was bullied through in 1835 and called for complete Cherokee removal
by the winter of 1838 to 1839.76 Although the Chickasaws were ambiva-
69. JEREMIAH EVARTS, Memorial of Citizen of Massachusetts, in CHEROKEE REMOVAL, supra
note 55, at 224, 232. R
70. JEREMIAH EVARTS, Memorial of the American Board, in CHEROKEE REMOVAL, supra note
55, at 290, 299. R
71. See COTTERILL, supra note 60, at 239. R
72. Id. at 238–39.
73. FOREMAN, supra note 22, at 13. R
74. Treaty with the Seminole, art. 7, U.S.-Seminole Indians, May 9, 1832, 7 Stat. 368.
75. H.R. Rep. No. 82-2503, supra note 22, at 575. R
76. Id. at 268.
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lent about living with the Choctaws (who outnumbered them by three to
one), these two tribes signed removal treaties soon as well. The “1836
Creek War” completed the tail ends of Creek removal, as the last of the
Five Tribes holding out.77
The federal government had imposed a removal policy upon the
Five Tribes, to secure valuable natural resources. The tribes’ only condo-
lence was that the removal treaties allowed fee simple title to the new
lands and permanent Indian political existence outside of state bounda-
ries and jurisdiction.78 Faced with genocide, the Five Tribes accepted re-
moval to an Indian territory in what is now Oklahoma.79 Only a sacrifice
of their eastern land base would ensure native sovereignty, so the Five
Tribes headed west on the infamous “Trail of Tears” associated with re-
moval.80 Meanwhile, the success of Jackson’s removal policy led to immi-
grant bonfires and celebrations across Mississippi and other areas in the
Southeast.81
After 1835, thousands of southeastern Indians from Georgia,
North Carolina, eastern Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and other
southern states moved west as well. Other tribes such as the Cherokees
in western North Carolina stayed behind or waited a few decades before
migrating.82 From 1855 to 1858, a third Seminole War broke out between
federal forces and Seminoles defying removal. In the process, the Semi-
nole population decreased from 5,000 to only 500 individuals in the
Southeast.83
2. The Civil War and Indian Sovereignty
Most members of the Five Tribes were either neutral or pro-Union
as the civil war approached.84 When federal representatives turned down
Indian offers to help fight as a “savage practice,” most tribal members
succumbed to the pressure of their slave owning members and aligned
with the Confederacy.85 In addition, Confederate treaties with the Five
Tribes were very favorable to the Indians, allowing for native political
77. GREEN, supra note 41, at 185.
78. VINE DELORIA JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FU-
TURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 23 (1984).
79. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-2503, supra note 23, at maps 10, 12, 16, 18, & 59. R
80. DeRosier, supra note 54, at 237–47. R
81. Id.
82. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 8. R
83. Charles H. Fairbanks, The Ethno-Archeology of the Florida Seminole, in A SEMINOLE
SOURCE BOOK 187 (William C. Sturtevant, ed., 1987).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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representation as well as full title to tribal lands.86 Fighting alongside the
Confederacy during the war, the Five Tribes lost tribal members as well
as four million dollars in cattle and other property.87
As the war continued, a bill surfaced in Congress on February 20,
1865 that called for statehood in the Indian territory. The bill attempted
to increase federal control over Indian affairs, as the text of the bill called
for a federally appointed governor and core of officials for the new In-
dian state.88 This statehood proposal did not ensure continued Indian
sovereignty and self-determination because the form of government pro-
posed required the integration, and oversight, of exterior federal offi-
cials.89 Although the statehood proposal that surfaced in Congress in
1865 never made any progress, it corresponded with the rising value of
the land and resource base of the Five Tribes. After all, the Five Tribes
had traded indigenous southern resources for a vast chunk of the West-
ern United States.
The day that Congress ratified Civil War peace treaties with the
Five Tribes, they gave approval to railroad charters and conditionally
granted the corporations a ten year title option to Indian land needed for
the railroads. In passing these Acts, Congress created incentives for the
railroads to advocate for territorial, or statehood, status for the Indian
territory so lands conditionally granted to the railroads would be public
lands once the area came into the Union as a State or a Territory.90 Imme-
diately following the war, Kansan and Texan cattleman illegally used
over six million acres of Cherokee land for grazing purposes.91 Tribal
emigrants, including Delawares, Munsies, Shawnees, Osages, Modocs,
and Sioux, migrated to the western lands of the Five Tribes soon after the
war as well. The federal Commissioner for the Five Tribes recognized the
increasing demand for the Five Tribes’ land resources following the war:
The treaties of 1866, and other treaties also, guarantee to the
five civilized tribes the possession of their lands; but, without
the moral and physical power that is represented by the Army
of the United States, what are these treaties worth as a protec-
tion against the rapacious greed of the homeless people of the
86. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 78, at 24. R
87. H. CRAIG MINER, THE CORPORATION AND THE INDIAN: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND IN-
DUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION IN INDIAN TERRITORY 1865–1907, at 4 (1976).
88. Allen G. Applen, An Attempted State Government: The Okmulgee Constitution in In-
dian Territory 1870–1876, 3 KAN. Q. 89 (1971).
89. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 78, at 19. R
90. Amos Maxwell, The Sequoyah Convention, 28 CHRON. OKLA., no. 2, 1950, at 161, 163.
91. Hanna R. Warren, Reconstruction in the Cherokee Nation, 45 CHRON. OKLA., no. 2,
1967, at 180, 187.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\53-1\NMN102.txt unknown Seq: 16 11-APR-13 8:47
16 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 53
States who seek homesteads within the borders of the Indian
Territory?92
As pressure from railroads, industry, speculators, and both immigrant
and other tribal settlers increased on the Five Tribes’ western land, so
did the demand for more government in Indian territory.
Immigrant settlers often felt that the Five Tribes possessed no for-
mal government, since the policies of the tribal governments historically
were not recorded in text. Land hungry settlers disliked communal con-
cepts that prevented individual ownership and control over natural re-
sources, and such systems bolstered a perception that the Five Tribes’
governments were inadequate. This excerpt from an official federal gov-
ernment report exemplifies the immigrant attitude toward the Five
Tribes’ sovereignty:
Soon after the [Civil] [W]ar the waves of commerce in their
westward flow began to surge over the boundaries of the In-
dian Territory. Then the inadequacy of their legislative and ju-
dicial bodies to maintain law and order and the fallacy of their
system of land tenure became apparent.93
The immigrant perception of the system of government in the Five
Tribes’ territories was wrong, however. For example, the Creeks always
had an elaborate system of self-governance, and successfully employed
an executive branch, a legislature, a judicial branch, and a police force in
their territory before the Civil War.94 Still, the federal government felt
that the Five Tribes’ system of self-governance before the Civil War was
inadequate and needed reformation.
C. The Okmulgee Council and the First Serious Statehood Proposal
One of the stipulations included in the peace treaties that the fed-
eral government and the Five Tribes signed after the Civil War was a
clause that the tribes would form a council with the aim of creating one
government for the five diverse Indian nations.95 The idea of a grand
council for a pan-Indian state was a last attempt by the federal govern-
ment to accommodate the Five Tribes. Although any Indian state would
necessarily diminish tribal sovereignty, the federal government was al-
92. Atkins, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1886), reprinted in DOCU-
MENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 169 (Francis Paul Prucha, ed., 1975).
93. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE FIVE CIVI-
LIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1906, at
5 (1906) [hereinafter CFCT 1906].
94. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 78, at 22. R
95. Id.
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lowing members of the Five Tribes to control the process and organiza-
tion of any statehood plan.96 Soon after, however, the federal
government would change its Indian policy to one based on direct con-
trol, and begin to dictate a specific governmental form.97
The 1866 peace treaties provided funding until 1874 for an Indian
International Council—more commonly known as the Okmulgee Coun-
cil.98 The Okmulgee Council would meet at the Creek Capitol in the town
of Okmulgee to formulate a statehood plan, preserve traditional culture,
and maintain tribal affiliations.99 The initial meetings of the Okmulgee
Council occurred in September and December of 1870. Nine tribes at-
tended the first Okmulgee session, including representatives from the
Five Tribes, the Osages, and several smaller tribes.100 But in March of the
same year, a compulsory congressional plan for a State of Oklahoma that
would incorporate the Five Tribes’ territory emerged.101 These concur-
rent movements officially set the stage for future statehood arguments,
i.e., would there be dual statehood which allowed the Five Tribes to re-
tain some sovereign and independent status, or would there be one state
called Oklahoma that included the Indian territory?
The Okmulgee Council began meeting on an annual basis, and
even drafted a Constitution in 1871 that called for a government com-
plete with a judicial system and a general assembly (including a senate
and house of representatives).102 The Okmulgee Constitution was elabo-
rate, and was the product of detailed formulation and drafting meetings
requiring committees on federal relations, international relations, judici-
ary, finance, education and agriculture, and congressional bills and
rules.103 However, the Okmulgee Council never obtained lawmaking
powers because neither the tribes, nor Congress, ever ratified the Okmul-
gee Constitution.104
Soon after the Council drafted the Constitution, it received the
first inkling of a negative federal reaction. In 1871, President Ulysses
Grant announced his support for the Okmulgee Council, with two quali-
96. Id. at 23.
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id.
99. CHIEF G. W. GRAYSON, A CREEK WARRIOR FOR THE CONFEDERACY: THE AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY OF CHIEF G. W. GRAYSON, 147–48 (W. David Baird, ed., 1988).
100. Journal of the General Council of the Indian Territory, 3 CHRON. OKLA., no. 1, 1925, at
33.
101. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 163. R
102. Journal of the General Council of the Indian Territory, supra note 100, at 39–46. R
103. Id.
104. Muriel H. Wright, A Report to the General Council of the Indian Territory Meeting at
Okmulgee in 1873, 34 CHRON. OKLA., no. 1, 1956, at 7.
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fications: (1) the proposed Indian government possessed too much au-
tonomy as the proposed Constitution did not require future Okmulgee
legislation to receive federal congressional approval; and (2) federal rep-
resentatives should appoint the Governor of the pan-Indian state instead
of election by tribal members.105 President Grant seemed inclined to al-
low Indian autonomy—but only to the extent that Congress approved
and controlled the pan-Indian state. Transmogrified as such, the Okmul-
gee statehood plan would have become another disguised affront to tri-
bal sovereignty.
Okmulgee organizers expected five hundred tribal representatives
at the June 1872 meeting. Representatives attended from as far off as
New York, the Great Lakes, and the plains.106 Ironically, President
Grant’s position on Indian statehood made clear that a truly sovereign
Indian state was nearly impossible. With this in mind, from 1872 to 1876
the Council concentrated its efforts on protesting any attempt to en-
croach on or legislate Indian lands.107 Cherokee representatives in partic-
ular worked against federal territorial aims and concentrated their efforts
on pan-Indian unity.108 In the end, all Five Tribes opposed statehood as
imagined by the federal government as an unacceptable encroachment
on tribal sovereignty.109 This tribal opposition led to the end of federal
funding for the Council in 1874.110
Not only was the Okmulgee Council having differences with the
federal government, but there was internal dissension as well. The
Creeks, Choctaws, and a few smaller tribes ratified the first Okmulgee
Constitution, but other tribes did not out of fear of losing land.111 The
Chickasaws led the small tribe opposition to the Okmulgee Constitu-
tion.112 Small tribes, such as the Chickasaws and Seminoles, feared domi-
nation at the hands of larger tribes due to unequal representation.113
Representatives finally worked out a revised agreement, suitable to both
large and small tribes, which provided for representation of one senator
per tribe and one representative per 1,000 in tribal population.114 Despite
105. Applen, supra note 88, at 93. R
106. ARRELL M. GIBSON, THE CHICKASAWS 245 (1971). The federal government paid Ok-
mulgee representatives four dollars a day plus mileage expenses. Id.
107. See Applen, supra note 88, at 96. R
108. MORRIS L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 1838–1907, at
296 (1938).
109. See GRAYSON, supra note 99, at 158. R
110. Id.
111. Id. at 147.
112. See Applen, supra note 88, at 95. R
113. See id.
114. See GRAYSON, supra note 99, at 148 (the pace of negotiations was slow because R
meetings often required four or five interpretations).
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this eventual Indian consensus, federal representatives rejected the final
constitution proposed by the tribes because it did not include any provi-
sions for individual land allotments.115
The federal government preferred individual land allotments to
collective tribal ownership, which was an unworkable communal con-
cept in a system designed around individual rights. Moreover, the fed-
eral government hoped to carve out property needed for railroad
expansions.116 Federal representatives, therefore, were increasingly stri-
dent in their demand that the Five Tribes allocate land in individual al-
lotments rather than communally.117 Okmulgee representatives began to
fear that the federal government would attempt to impose its own form
of statehood over Indian lands to gain control over Indian natural re-
sources.118 The Council therefore drafted a resolution detailing its oppo-
sition to any federal sales of Indian land to railroad companies, and
“protesting against any legislation by Congress impairing the obligation
of any treaty provision, and especially against the creation of any gov-
ernment over the Indian Territory other than that of the General [Okmul-
gee] Council.”119 Without federal funding, or any hope of success, the
Okmulgee Council continued to hold sessions until 1878.120 The Five
Tribes tried to use Indian statehood as a defense against infringements
on tribal sovereignty, but the federal government envisioned statehood
as a control mechanism that would diminish native autonomy and allow
for greater federal control over tribal natural resources.
It was no accident that federal representatives envisioned Indian
statehood as a method to diminish tribal sovereignty and gain control of
natural resources. Demand for the Five Tribes’ land only forty years after
removal was growing, along with the immigrant population of the coun-
try.121 Congress passed the first legislation allowing railroads to rent In-
dian land in the mid-1870s.122 Around the same time, in 1874, a federal
commission traveled to the Indian territory of the Five Tribes and recom-
mended statehood for the area.123 Scholar and advocate Vine Deloria de-
115. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 78, at 24. R
116. See id. at 25.
117. Id. at 24.
118. See Journal of the General Council of the Indian Territory, supra note 100, at 42. R
119. Id.
120. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 78, at 24. R
121. SUSAN WORK, THE “TERMINATED” FIVE TRIBES OF OKLAHOMA: THE EFFECT OF FED-
ERAL LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE TREATMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SEMINOLE
NATION, reprinted in A SEMINOLE SOURCE BOOK, supra note 83. R
122. Id.
123. See Maxwell, supra note 90, at 164. R
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scribes the relationship between Indian natural resources and the federal
insistence on approving and dictating any Indian statehood proposal:
It was inconceivable to the federal officials that [an Indian]
state could be admitted to the Union that did not provide for
free commerce with other states, and the communal holding of
land struck directly at the personal land tenure system already
entrenched in other states . . . how could commerce proceed
when the best that white citizens might ever achieve within
the new Indian state might be the leasing of lands? Property
rights, rather than political rights, doomed the Indian state
that the Congress had demanded the Indians form. . ..124
From the standpoint of the Five Tribes, an immigrant community of set-
tlers arrived, demanded individual allotments of land, challenged the
form of communal ownership by the Indian tribe or nation, and ulti-
mately attacked native sovereignty to achieve this goal. Breaking up tri-
bal land, in short, would erode collective Indian identity and
sovereignty.
The Five Tribes still had a substantial population and natural re-
source base. The federal Census population of Indians among the Five
Tribes in 1880 was 64,587 individuals.125 The land held by the Five Tribes
totaled over twenty million acres.126 This land was about the size of the
state of Maine, and in some areas was rich in minerals, timber, and agri-
cultural resources.127 The Indians held this land in common, much to the
chagrin of the immigrants.128
Members of the Five Tribes were primarily agriculturists, and
were stable and settled despite holding land in common. Individuals
considered improvements on land to be private property, with most tri-
bal members living on small individual farms or homesteads.129 Individ-
124. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 78, at 24. R
125. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE FIVE CIVI-
LIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1907,
558 (1907) [hereinafter CFCT 1907].
126. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
JUNE 30, 1903, at 8 (1903) [hereinafter CFCT 1903].
127. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1900, at 7–8 (1900) [hereinafter CFCT 1900].
128. LESLIE HEWES, OCCUPYING THE CHEROKEE COUNTRY OF OKLAHOMA 1 (Univ. of Neb.
Studies: New Series No. 57 1978). (“Cherokee culture, although markedly changed by con-
tacts with whites, was distinguished by a basic attitude toward the land — that it belonged
to all members of the tribe.”).
129. Id. at 5.
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uals controlled and occupied most of the better land, although the tribe
itself held title to the lands in common.130
In 1879, a man named David Payne led a group of white settlers
called the “Boomers” to mass on the southern Kansas border adjacent to
land of the Five Tribes.131 Starting in 1860, the population of Kansas had
increased from about 100,000 people to about 1,000,000 people.132 The
increasing number of Kansas immigrants craved Indian natural re-
sources to homestead and farm.133 Payne and the Boomers wanted the
“Unassigned Indian Lands” (in what became central Oklahoma) for
white settlers, but the Creek and Seminole ceded the land in 1866 for the
specific resettlement of other Indian nations.
Indian representatives, that had been involved with the defunct
Okmulgee Council, appealed to federal representatives in March of 1880
to prevent a Boomer invasion of the Five Tribes’ land.134 In April and
July of 1880, federal troops repelled two parties of Boomers led by Payne
that attempted to settle forcefully in Indian territory.135 Payne also en-
couraged homeless settlers to move onto Indian lands illegally, and his
contacts in Washington kept constant pressure on federal representatives
regarding the settlers’ need for Indian natural resources.136
By the 1880s the Five Tribes lost their attempts to control railroad
rights of way, leading to a proliferation of cattle and oil business inter-
ests westward as railroads accessed Indian lands.137 A pattern of dimin-
ished sovereignty emerged with the breakdown of native control, with
tribal infighting, hesitancy between tribes and federal representatives
over jurisdiction, and eventually the dominance of outsider corporations
with financial backing for land, cattle, oil, and gas.138 As the demand for
Indian natural resources rose, attacks on tribal sovereignty made predict-
able inroads.
Federal officials interested in Indian natural resources were con-
cerned that interlopers were monopolizing the most productive land in
the absence of controlling legislation. This situation provided the federal
government with rationale to involve themselves in autonomous Indian
130. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 8. R
131. GRAYSON, supra note 99, at 152. R
132. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE TENTH CENSUS, JUNE 1,
1880, at 4 (1883).
133. GRAYSON, supra note 99, at 152. R
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. MINER, supra note 87, at 115. R
138. Id. at 118–19.
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affairs.139 After the Boomer incidents, there had been a general lull in
settler demand for Indian natural resources.140 The land grants that Con-
gress promised the railroad companies if Indian land became public had
expired, and the industries were content to rent resources in a territory
that had no tax liabilities.141 This brief slack in immigrant demand for
Indian resources disappeared when federal officials opened the “Unas-
signed Indian Lands” to non-native settlers in 1889.142 A federal Commis-
sion would later write:
Indian territory furnished too attractive a region to escape the
wave of trade desire and as a result there has been brought to
the domain of the [five] tribes a flood of humanity seeking its
share of prosperity, jostling and clamoring for opportunity
with that vigor and energy which characterizes Americans;
but which, in the light of the solemn treaties under which was
promised to these tribes the undisturbed possession and occu-
pancy of their lands, has been unseemly to a degree which
may well shock the mind of an impartial observer.143
By 1890, the immigrant demand for the natural resources of the Five
Tribes was larger than ever. If historical patterns continued, the Five
Tribes could anticipate some form of federal attack on tribal sovereignty
in an attempt to gain control of these valuable resources.
D. The Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes
In 1887, Congress directly attacked Indian self-determination by
passing the General Allotment Act.144 The Act called for Indian land to be
allotted in severalty,145 which federal officials described as “a direct divi-
sion of their estate with consequent individual ownership of their
homes.”146 The Five Tribes were exempt from the 1887 Act, so they
139. HEWES, supra note 128, at 47 (“Those who decried the land system of the Five Civi- R
lized Tribes as “un-American” and their tenure as impeding progress now had the addi-
tional argument that the “real“ Indian, the full blood, was being dispossessed in his own
country.”).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 165. R
143. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
JUNE 30, 1901, 7 (1901) [hereinafter CFCT 1901].
144. Indian General Allotment Act, Act Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (repealed
2000).
145. Id.
146. CFCT 1900, supra note 127, at 7. R
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waited.147 Congress passed the Dawes Act in 1889 and extended the allot-
ment requirement to the Five Tribes, under pressure from natural re-
source hungry settlers and Protestant missionaries who approved of
general assimilation but were concerned over settler corruption of
Indians.148
By 1892, there were two statehood bills on the floor in Congress.
The first called for dual statehood, and had the support of Democrats
hoping to gain representatives in Congress from two newly admitted
southern states.149 Tribes generally preferred this dual statehood propo-
sal as the lesser of two evils, for it retained some semblance of autonomy
and sovereignty in creating a pan-Indian state.150 The other bill called for
combining the Five Tribes’ territories with neighboring lands to create
one state.151 Republicans favored this single statehood proposal, as a
Democratic Oklahoma appeared inevitable.152 When the idea of single
statehood emerged in January of 1892, Creek leaders specifically objected
to the bill as a breach of previous treaties.153
On March 3, 1893, Congress passed legislation instructing the
President to appoint three commissioners to negotiate with the Five
Tribes over allotment.154 This group became the Commission to the Five
Civilized Tribes, or the Dawes Commission.155
The Dawes Commission’s first report specifically discounted the
implication that allotment was the first step in dismantling tribal sover-
eignty.156 The Commission felt that “while legislation by Congress for all
the petty needs of the Territory is impracticable in the highest degree, the
more urgent requirements of the people must be met by this means for
the present.”157 So, the Dawes Commission was not created to impose a
single state in the territories that would destroy tribal sovereignty.158
Early Commission reports implied that the government supported the
creation of a separate pan-Indian state, but considered allotment “requi-
147. Id.
148. See MICHAEL C. COLEMAN, PRESBYTERIAN MISSIONARY ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN
INDIANS 1837–1893, at 157 (1985).
149. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 166–67. R
150. Id. at 167.
151. Id. at 166.
152. Id.
153. Hodges, supra note 25, at 15. R
154. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612, 645.
155. GRAYSON, supra note 99, at 162. R
156. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE
FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE
30, 1899, 28 (1899) [hereinafter CFCT 1899].
157. Id.
158. Id.
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site and suitable to enable the ultimate creation of a State or States of the
Union which shall embrace the lands within said Indian Territory.”159
Initially, the Dawes Commission appeared to be the federal govern-
ment’s attempt to address perceived problems in the Five Tribes’ gov-
erning systems, without imposing a single statehood territorial
government.160
The Dawes Commission initially worried about the single state-
hood idea, because the Indians in the territory were becoming rapidly
outnumbered by waves of white immigrants and settlers.161 The 1899
Commission report stated that the conditions for statehood were “not yet
ripe” and “wholly impracticable,” since there were nearly four settlers
for every registered tribal citizen in the territory.162 From 1890 to 1900,
the settler to Indian ratio in the territories changed from 2:1 to 6:1.163
These settlers wanted representation in Congress, and it appeared clear
that some form of statehood would occur eventually.
Pressure mounted for the Commission to complete allotment so
that some form of statehood could be imposed on the territory, however
progress was slow. The Five Tribes would not even discuss allotment
with federal officials after the 1893 Act passed, because the Commission
only had negotiating power, and could not demand that tribes begin to
draft or rewrite tribal membership lists.164 Allotment was not a very pop-
ular idea among the Five Tribes, who wanted no form of statehood or
other infringement on their right to determine how to govern tribal
members and allocate natural resources.165
Many of the large landholders among the Cherokees, and other
tribes, also opposed allotment, for it would diminish their resource hold-
ings.166 Many within the tribal communities that disliked allotment ag-
gressively pursued opposition to the Commission.167 Critics of the Five
Tribes’ governments, on the other hand, felt that white settlers and
mixed-blood Indians were corrupting the land in common system by
monopolizing large tracts.168 Regardless, a Creek Chief, G.W. Grayson,
understood that allotment would lead to both diminished tribal sover-
159. CFCT 1899, supra note 156, at 66. R
160. GRAYSON, supra note 99, at 162. R
161. CFCT 1899, supra note 156, at 28. R
162. Id.
163. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 169. R
164. GRAYSON, supra note 99, at 164 n.23. R
165. Id. at 163.
166. CFCT 1901, supra note 143, at 11. R
167. CFCT 1906, supra note 93, at 7. R
168. Atkins, supra note 92, at 197. R
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eignty and immigrant attempts to exploit the five tribe’s natural
resources:
Here we, a people who had been a self-governing people for
hundreds and possibly a thousand years, who had a govern-
ment and administered its affairs ages before such an entity as
the United States was ever dreamed of, are asked and admon-
ished that we must give up all idea of local government,
change our system of land holding to that which we confi-
dently believed had pauperized thousands of white people—
all for why; not because we had violated any treaties with the
United States which guaranteed in solemn terms our undis-
turbed possession of these; not because of any respectable
number of intelligent Indians were clamoring for a change of
conditions; not because any non-enforcement of law prevailed
to a greater extent in the Indian territory than elsewhere; but
simply because regardless of the plain dictates of justice and a
[C]hristian conscience, the ruthless restless white man de-
manded it.169
The Dawes Commission had no ability or legal authority to impose allot-
ment, and was effectively powerless within the first few years due to
widespread tribal suspicion and opposition.170
Allotment represented the first step towards a form of Indian
statehood, and thus diminished tribal sovereignty. Federal officials were
frustrated by the lack of Indian cooperation, and began to address the
perceived need for a new government for the Five Tribes. On November
20, 1894, the Dawes Commission wrote that “the treaties never contem-
plated the un-American and absurd idea of a separate nationality in our
midst, with power as they may choose to organize a government of their
own, or not to organize any government nor allow one to be
organized. . ..”171
Federal officials were gearing up to debate, and attack the right of
the Five Tribes to remain sovereign. The same Commission report made
the natural resource motivations for this onslaught all too clear:
[I]t has become no longer possible. It is hardly necessary to
call attention to the contrast between the present conditions
surrounding this Territory and those under which it was set
apart. Large and populous States of the Union are now on all
sides or it, and one-half of it has been constituted a Territory
169. GRAYSON, supra note 99, at 163. R
170. Id. at 164.
171. Atkins, supra note 92, at 171. R
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of the United States. These States and this Territory are teem-
ing with population and increasing in numbers at a marvelous
rate. The resources of the Territory itself have been developed
to such a degree and are of such immense and tempting value
that they are attracting to it an irresistible pressure from enter-
prising citizens. The executory conditions contained in the
treaties have become impossible of execution. It is no longer
possible for the United States to keep its citizens out of the
Territory. Nor is [it] now possible for the Indians to secure to
each individual Indian his full enjoyment in common with
other Indians of the common property of the Territory.172
By 1894, the Commission had articulated its intentions and seemed pre-
pared to condone the incorporation of the Five Tribes’ territories into one
state with the lands of surrounding white settlers.173
The 54th session of Congress included a delegate from Indian ter-
ritory, and three bills were introduced from 1895 to 1896 calling for a
“Territory of Indianola.”174 The federal government was determined to
gain control of Indian natural resources through some form of statehood,
whether the Five Tribes liked the idea or not.
By 1896, federal officials determined that they would have to em-
power the activist Commission to legally proceed with allotment and
statehood.175 The Commission recognized the federal mood in 1896,
when it reached several preliminary agreements with the Five Tribes that
still required verification by tribal members. On June 10, 1896, Congress
passed an annual allocation bill that expanded the Commission’s power
to allow them to determine citizenship and tribal enrollment.176 The bill
memorialized the federal government’s intentions to revamp and re-
create tribal government:
It is hereby declared to be the duty of the United States to
establish a government in the Indian Territory which will rec-
tify the many inequalities and discriminations now existing in
said Territory, and afford needful protection to the lives and
property of all citizens and residents thereof.177
172. Id. at 191.
173. Id.
174. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 188. R
175. CFCT 1906, supra note 93, at 7. R
176. Id.
177. Id. at 9 (citing Appropriations Act of 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 340 (1896)) (“Mean-
while matters grew from bad to worse and Congress recognized the fact that if the Indians
would not agree to any plan which would reform the growing evils the United States Gov-
ernment was in duty bound to correct them arbitrarily.”).
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The 1896 bill only allowed three months to register all members of the
Five Tribes.178 The requirements to be placed on tribal citizenship rolls
were: blood inheritance with a continuous affiliation and residence,
adoption by national or tribal council, freedmen under certain treaty
stipulations, appeals to the Dawes Commission, and inclusion via court
decision, or intermarriage.179 When it became clear that this short period
was too optimistic, the Commission abolished the deadline.180 This was
only the beginning of the Commission’s troubles, as new difficulties
emerged.
1. Enrollment
Each of the Five Tribes had their own set of problems with the
enrollment process. The Creeks had internal dissent over tribal member-
ship—some wanted a blanket policy that would make African-American
and mixed blood freedmen that were not included on older tribal rolls
full tribal citizens.181 The Seminoles spoke little English, and could not
provide much of the census information, or even established family
names.182 The Chickasaw and Choctaw held their lands in common and
had high degrees of intermarriage, making it difficult to determine spe-
cific tribal membership.183 The Cherokee were the most difficult, as 985
Delaware Indians from Kansas that joined the Cherokee tribe in return
for 157,600 acres felt that they should receive individual Cherokee land
allotments as tribal members, whereas the Cherokees disagreed with any
additional allotment to the Delawares.184 A United States Court of Claims
ultimately had to address the issue.185
The demand for Indian natural resources led to scores of false
claims for enrollment. Green McCurtain, the Principal Chief of the Choc-
taw Nation, wrote on October 3, 1900 that “[T]here was a wild rush to get
in applications. The applicants were, in almost every instance, white peo-
ple from the surrounding States, who had never before claimed citizen-
ship, but who were induced by the allurements alone of getting
something for nothing. . ..”186 Litigation emerged over enrollment, in-
cluding those filed by freedmen who wished to register in full on tribal
178. Appropriations Act of 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 339 (1896).
179. CFCT 1899, supra note 156, at 11. R
180. Id. at 17.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id. at 12–13.
183. Id. at 14.
184. Id. at 17.
185. Id. at 17; Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 38 Ct. Cl. 234 (1903), aff’d and modi-
fied, 193 U.S. 127 (1904).
186. CFCT 1901, supra note 143, at 217. R
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rolls to receive the largest possible allotments.187 In addition, many of the
Mississippi Choctaws that had remained east during removal now
wanted to migrate west and receive allotments.188 Fraudulent land agents
often manipulated these eastern Choctaws, and offered them assistance
and transportation in exchange for liens on land allotments.189 Claimants
came from everywhere, including the Gulf of Mexico, the Great Lakes,
Oregon, and Massachusetts.190 By 1898, the Commission was under siege,
and could not handle the barrage of natural resource driven enrollment
claims.191
2. The Beginning of Allotments
Despite these setbacks, federal officials were determined to com-
plete allotment and finalize some sort of statehood. A Commission re-
port described the federal reaction to the problems that plagued the
Dawes Commission from 1893 to 1898:
Under these conditions Congress was in 1898 fairly confronted
with the alternative of either abandoning its policy and abol-
ishing the Commission, or else of converting the Commission
from merely a negotiating body into also an executive and
semijudicial [sic] body, and of proceeding with the work
under the constitutional power of Congress, and largely, at
least, regardless of the will of the tribes.192
In 1898, Congress passed the Curtis Act, which incorporated several
agreements between the Commission and the Five Tribes, and required
allotment in the territories of the Five Tribes.193 The federal government
insisted that allotment was for the benefit of the tribal members.194 Fed-
eral representatives were convinced that the Five Tribes could not han-
dle their own affairs—or used that justification to allocate the Five
Tribes’ natural resources, and completely dismantle any semblance of
187. CFCT 1906, supra note 93, at 15. R
188. Id.
189. AFTER REMOVAL: THE CHOCTAW IN MISSISSIPPI 98 (Samuel J. Wells & Roseanna
Tubby, eds., 1986).
190. CFCT 1906, supra note 93, at 32. R
191. Id.
192. CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 5. R
193. CFCT 1901, supra note 143, at 9. R
194. CFCT 1899, supra note 155, at 7 (“the results sought to be obtained by the United R
States Government in Indian Territory are absolutely essential to the welfare, happiness,
and prosperity of that race whose origin is shrouded in mystery and romance, and the sum
of whose destiny is soon to set, leaving no evidence of material or intellectual growth to
mark its passing.”).
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tribal sovereignty.195 A Commission report acknowledges this rapacious
intention, but blamed it on inadequate tribal capacity:
That was the beginning not only of the allotment of the land,
or rather the preparatory work therefor, but also of the efface-
ment of the tribal governments. The primary cause of this step
was the incapacity of the tribes for self-government.196
The Curtis Act allowed the Commission to access older tribal roles to
complete enrollment.197 If the Commission and any of the Five Tribes
could not agree on allotment, the Curtis Act included deadlines after
which the Commission could determine allotment.198 With the passage of
the Curtis Act, the Commission had the authority to proceed with allot-
ment.199 Putting aside the cause and effect quandary, weakened tribal
government was the ultimate bedmate of allotment.
An expanded four-person Commission worked with renewed
speed, and managed to complete a preliminary enrollment of the Semi-
noles200 by July of 1898, and quantify the individual Seminole allotment
at 40 acres. The Commission commenced Creek enrollment on April 1,
1899, with a preliminary individual allotment allocation of 160 acres.201
On June 30, 1899, however, only the northeast portion of Creek territory
showed more than scattered progress on actual allotments.202 The Com-
mission predicted that enrollment would be complete in at least four of
the Five Tribes by June 30, 1900, and that all surveying and appraising of
land could finish by 1901 pending additional appropriations.203 The
Commission also estimated that by completion, there would be a total of
195. DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 92, at 197 (“With the Cur- R
tis Act, Congress accomplished by legislation what the Dawes Commission has been una-
ble to do by negotiation—effectively destroy the tribal governments in the Indian
Territory.”).
196. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE FIVE CIVI-
LIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1905,
579 (1905) [hereinafter CFCT 1905].
197. CFCT 1901, supra note 143, at 13. R
198. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 78, at 25. R
199. Id.
200. CFCT 1899, supra note 156, at 13. R
201. COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
JUNE 30, 1902 41 (1902) [hereinafter CFCT 1902].
202. COMM’R TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, LAWS, DECISIONS, AND
REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE WORK OF THE COMMISSIONER TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 1893
TO 1906, exhibit 8 (1906).
203. CFCT 1899, supra note 156, at 12. R
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84,000 enrolled citizens in the Five Tribes.204 But the federal government
had effectively limited the current, and future, populations of the Five
Tribes, and weakened the collective options of tribal members by
splintering communal land and resource holdings.
3. Allotments and Tribal Government
The federal government remained committed to revamping the
governments of the Five Tribes. Reiterating the federal objective of
blended statehood, the Commission wrote in 1899:
Slowly but persistently the waves of public opinion and senti-
ment have surged upon the sand foundations of the tribal gov-
ernments until dissolution is now all but complete, and with
the Government of the United States lies the responsibility of
seeing that the transitory stage from fragile and impermanent
tribal governments to sound footing among the sisterhood of
States of the Union be passed in safety and wis-
dom. . .Gradually the old, unstable structures of Indian gov-
ernments are giving way to a substantial modern form of
government which shall harmonize and blend in our national
scheme of civil rule. . .pending the establishment of a territo-
rial or state government. . .205
As the federal government gained control over allotment, the question
for the Five Tribes became how to salvage the statehood situation rather
than how to avoid it altogether.206
The last fight for the tribes in 1899 would be over the eventual
determination of single, or dual, statehood for the surrounding territo-
ries. Dual statehood, including one pan-Indian state, was the tribes’ best
hope to preserve a sense of sovereignty and autonomy. On January 14,
1899, the Dawes Commission promised in writing to the Cherokees that
the tribe would never be part of any settler dominated state without the
tribe’s express approval, and that if a state emerged against the wishes of
the tribe, it would be a state composed solely of the Five Tribes’ territo-
ries.207 These written promises appeared to secure some degree of future
Indian sovereignty.
204. Id.
205. CFCT 1899, supra note 156, at 27. R
206. See COLEMAN, supra note 148, at 62 (“Choctaws used increasing expertise in the R
ways of Americans as a defense against incorporation, and struggled throughout the rest of
the nineteenth century to maintain their separate existence as a nation. . . Although. . .the
Choctaws could not escape the allotment crusade to break Indian lands into individual
farms.”).
207. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 168. R
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As allotment proceeded, the Commission faced even more
problems over natural resource allocation and allotment than it had over
enrollment. The Commission felt that the educated members of the tribe
were corrupt, and threatened the integrity of their work.208
However, immigrants and settlers that coveted Indian natural re-
sources posed the greatest threat to any semblance of honest allot-
ments.209 The Commission described the relation between those
manipulating allotees and the popular demand for Choctaw timber
lands:
The timber lands, therefore, present a tempting field to specu-
lators, who have used every means to induce fullblood Indi-
ans to select timber land in allotment, hoping to obtain the
timber at its appraised value, or even a lower price.210
The Choctaw timber had commercial value totaled 1,247,473.63 acres, ex-
emplifying the scope of potential natural resource exploitation during
the allotment process.211
Not only did the Commission have to face corrupt Indians and
throngs of exploitative immigrant land and timber speculators, wealthy
oil and gas interests were attempting to manipulate the allotment system
as well.212 Indeed, speculators and investors pressed the allotment pro-
cess to profit off Indian natural resources such as land, minerals, oil, and
gas.213
208. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 6. “The same interests are opposed to the completion R
of [allotment] that were opposed to its being commenced, and as the end draws near they
pursue with redoubled energy the same tactics of obstruction, fault finding, exaggeration,
slander, and all manners of false statements, in order to confuse the situation, muddy the
waters, embarrass, hinder, and prevent the conclusion of the work—we venture the asser-
tion that inquiry will develop that they are false in substance, and are voiced only by men
whom we have foiled, or are seeking to foil, in unlawful and predatory practices, or by the
credulous and deluded followers of such men.” CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 9. R
209. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 36. The same forces that lobbied Washington to legis- R
late Indian territories manifest themselves in less respectable occupations as well. Middle-
men and speculators would coach allotees that were naive to the corruption associated
with natural resources that appeared abundant. Id. For instance, less educated Indians took
nearly every pine timber allotment at the instigation of speculators. Id.
210. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 46. R
211. Id.
212. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 6. According to the Commission, the discovery of R
petroleum compounded exploitation efforts: “To home influences have been added strong
outside alliances, arising chiefly, from the discoveries of petroleum in the Territory. Aggre-
gation of capital and influence have combined to push predatory schemes.” Id.
213. Id. at 40.
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One cannot underestimate the proliferation of immigrant profiteers at
the turn of the century. Out of 101,754 individuals in Cherokee territory
in 1900, for example, only 35,000 were tribal members.214
As enrollment decreased and allotment increased, pressure for
statehood in the area rose. In 1900, the Commission explained their in-
tention to impress upon “ignorant” freedmen and Indians the benefits of
civilization and education, and a federal government that purportedly
afforded liberty, protection, peace, and prosperity for its subjects.215 As
prospects for dual statehood dimmed, the Commission made mention in
its 1900 report of statehood after allotment as part of an “express deter-
mination of Congress to bring about such changes as would enable the
ultimate creation of a territory of the United States, with the view to the
admission of the same as a State of the Union.”216
The Commission never mentioned statehood again, because it
was inevitable that single statehood would prevail.217 But nevertheless,
the Commission blatantly documented an example of the relationship
between decreased tribal sovereignty and settlers’ exploitation of Indian
natural resources in 1900:
Had it been possible to secure from the five tribes a cession to
the United States of the entire territory at a given price, the
tribes to receive its equivalent in value, preferably a stipulated
amount of the land thus ceded, equalizing values with cash,
the duties of the commission would have been immeasurably
simplified, and the Government would have been saved incal-
culable expense. One has but to contemplate the mineral re-
sources, developed, and undeveloped, and existing legislation
with reference thereto, to realize the advantages which
awaited such a course. When an understanding is had, how-
ever of the great difficulties which have been experienced in
inducing the tribes to accept allotment in severalty—it will be
seen how impossible it would have been to have adopted a
more radical scheme of tribal extinguishment.218
Therefore, the allotment process was merely the latest ploy in a plot
stretching back to the first interactions between federal officials and In-
dian nations—a scheme designed to challenge and eliminate tribal sover-
eignty as the first step toward the goal of gaining total control over
Indian natural resources.
214. RUSSELL THORNTON, THE CHEROKEES: A POPULATION HISTORY 116 (1990).
215. CFCT 1900, supra note 127, at 8. R
216. Id. at 7.
217. See generally CFCT 1901–07, supra notes 21, 93, 125, 126, 143, 196, & 201. R
218. CFCT 1900, supra note 127, at 7. R
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4. The Completion of Allotments
Facing the single statehood alternative, tribal members stepped
up their efforts to achieve dual statehood in the early 1900s.219 But the
railroad companies that supported an Indian state after the Civil War
vehemently opposed dual statehood at this time.220 The railroad corpora-
tions now enjoyed a modest yearly rental fee to tribes for the land that
they used, and felt that a single state government controlled by settlers
would tax and legislate them less than an Indian state.221 Railroad lobby-
ists combined with oil, gas, land, and settler interests to form an unoffi-
cial “Territorial Ring” to press for the elimination of dual sovereignty in
the area, the opening of the land to immigrant settlers, and single state-
hood.222 The Dawes Commission felt it was unjust and in conflict with
the spirit of the nation to deny the settlers the right of franchise, despite
their earlier admittance that, “[t]he non-citizen does not own a foot of
soil. . .and with a voice in legislation, the non-citizen would soon legis-
late the Indian into a state of innocuous desuetude.”223
By 1901, there was no doubt that the Commission was a hostile
and aggressive force hoping to eliminate tribal sovereignty and perhaps
even the Five Tribes themselves. The Commission report from that year
underscored federal resistance to tribal sovereignty, insisting that “[i]t
could not have been contemplated by Congress that within the borders
of the United States should be permitted to spring up independent re-
publics, unanswerable to the General Government.”224 The Commission
took this position, despite acknowledging that the Five Tribes “indepen-
dent of treaty considerations, [are] entitled to the undisturbed possession
of a domain of reasonable proportions.”225 This government declaration
confirms the hostile federal attitude toward rising tribal demands for
dual independence or statehood. In 1901, the federal judiciary decided
independent enrollment suits, which allowed the Commission to finish
tribal enrollments.226 On March 13, 1901, the appropriations bill for the
Commission included a clause reasserting the Curtis Act stipulation that
219. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 172. R
220. Id. at 171.
221. Id.
222. MINER, supra note 87, at 77. R
223. CFCT 1899, supra note 156, at 28. R
224. CFCT 1901, supra note 143, at 6. R
225. Id.
226. See generally id. at 112–28 (Appendix 13, Decisions of United States Courts in In-
dian Territories); see also Kimberlin v. Comm’n to Five Civilized Tribes, 53 S.W. 467, 3
Indian Terr. 16 (1899); 1898 COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 458–526 (1898).
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allowed the Commission to create deadlines for enrollment.227 On April
2, 1901, the Commission subsequently closed the Seminole citizenship
roll, and worked diligently to complete that tribe’s allotments.228 By Feb-
ruary 28, 1902, the Enid and Anadarko Railroad Act passed through
Congress, and resulted in railroad territory acquisitions that were ex-
empted from allotment.229 Confident that there were even more available
resources, the Commission began to make exemptions from allotments
for other interests.230
On June 28, 1902, the Commission completed Seminole allotment
and recommended selling the surplus of 18,630.64 acres to settlers with
the proceeds going to the tribe.231 In August of the same year, members
of the Cherokee nation approved a July 1, 1902, Act of Congress that
stipulated a Cherokee allotment of 110 acres per person.232 Also on July 1,
1902, Congress ratified an Act that set Choctaw and Chickasaw allot-
ments at 320 acres for full tribal members and forty acres for freedmen.233
The Creek nation also received a new deadline for enrollment.234 After
this, all five of the tribes would have completed enrollment, quantified
individual allotments, and prepared to begin allotting lands.235 In the
case of the Seminole, land allotment was already complete.236
Allotment acre amounts were approximate, with actual allotments
based on land value. The Commission used a sliding scale that allowed
lesser acreage allotments for more valuable land and greater acreage al-
lotments for less valued areas.237 For instance, the Commission valued
the typical 320 acre Choctaw and Chickasaw allotment at $1,041.28
227. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 832, 31 Stat. 1058, 1077 (1901) (appropriations act for the
current and contingent expenses of the Indian Department). “The rolls made by the Com-
mission to the Five Civilized Tribes, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall
be final, and the persons whose names are found thereon shall alone constitute the several
tribes which they represent; and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to
fix a time by agreement with said tribes or either of them for closing said rolls, but upon
failure or refusal of said tribes or any of them to agree thereto, then the Secretary of the
Interior shall fix a time for closing said rolls, after which no name shall be added thereto.”
228. CRCT 1902, supra note 201, at 43–45. R
229. Enid and Anadarko Railroad Act, Pub. L. 57-26, 32 Stat. 43, 43–44 (1902); see also
CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 8. R
230. MINER, supra note 87, at 212 (According to H. Craig Miner, the railroads’ success R
was symbolic of a Gilded Age in which rapid change, action not evaluation, and the pre-
domination of the fastest and loudest interests prevailed).
231. CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 56. R
232. Id. at 37–38.
233. Act of July 1, 1902, Pub. L. 57-228, 32 Stat. 641, 642 (1902).
234. Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861, 869–70 (1901).
235. See CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 55–56. R
236. Id. at 56.
237. Id. at 50–52.
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($130.16 for freedmen), and adjusted any acreage allotment based on
fluctuations in land value.238 Land valuation was based on available tim-
ber or other natural resources.239
Legislation that addressed allotment quantifications also included
a clause that exempted from allotment a parcel of land surrounding the
village of Sulphur, with twenty dollars per acre compensation to the
Chickasaw.240 This parcel, just under 640 acres, was a valuable natural
resource area, including minerals, sulfur springs, and the surrounding
creeks of Sulphur, Rock and Buckhorn.241 As tribal governments disman-
tled, natural resources like those were exempted from allotment and
carved out as almost pure takings.
The Commission had nearly completed allotments for the Five
Tribes by 1903. All told, the Commission issued over 90,000 allotments
totaling 19,511,899.39 acres.242 The Commission reviewed more than
128,406 applications for enrollment, with scores of others pending due to
court proceedings.243 For example, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizen-
ship Court eventually decided 256 cases that affected 3,487 claimants
(granting only 161 tribal members).244
Corruption that plagued the allotments continued. Speculators
pressed Indians who had hoped to avoid allotment into choosing widely
separated tracts of ten or more acres to discourage possession and im-
provement, and encourage Indians to sell their allotments.245 The Com-
mission sought to discourage this specific practice with a draft resolution
on August 8, 1903, but was overruled by Interior Department officials
within a month.246
Meanwhile, lands that were contested by the Delawares sat fal-
low.247 The Supreme Court decided the case in its October 1904 term.248
The Court decided to allot the Delawares a full 160 acre allotment re-
gardless of whether there were sufficient lands, with an offset for the
approximately 157,000 acres promised to the Delawares in treaty.249
238. Id. at 50–52.
239. Id. at 50.
240. Act of July 1, 1902, Pub. L. 57-228, 32 Stat. 641, 655 (1902).
241. Id. at 655.
242. CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 34. The Commission issued 6,950,043.66 acres to the R
Choctaws; 4,703,108.05 acres to the Chickasaws; 4,420,070.13 to the Cherokees; 3,072,813.16
acres to the Creeks; and 365,854.39 to the Seminoles.
243. Id. at 8.
244. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 585. R
245. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 38. R
246. Id. at 38–40.
247. CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 46. R
248. Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127, 127 (1904).
249. Id. at 349.
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The Commission estimated in 1903 that the cost of allotment to
date for the federal government was approximately five cents an acre.250
At this point, Creek lands were virtually allotted, Seminole lands fin-
ished, and the Commission projected that Cherokee allotment would be
completed by 1904, followed by Chickasaw and Choctaw by early
1905.251 Predictably, the Commission recommended selling surplus
Creek lands to immigrant speculators and settlers.252 On March 3, 1903,
the Indian Appropriation Act passed, and included a call for the dissolu-
tion of the Seminole government by March 4, 1906 (the other four tribes
already had agreed to dissolution in previous allotment agreements.).253
As such, allotment directly and immediately led to diminished tribal
sovereignty.
On June 3, 1903, the exhaustion of funds forced the Commission
to suspend activities until the next fiscal year.254 No additional enroll-
ments occurred in the 1903 to 1904 fiscal year, except among the Creeks,
who did not have an agreed upon closing date for enrollment applica-
tions.255 That year, the Secretary of the Interior ordered notices printed in
English, and Muscogee, setting the closing date for Creek enrollment to
June 13, 1904.256 Shortly after appropriating funds to the Commission in
April of 1904, however, Congress reopened the settled Delaware claims,
and reopened the tribal rolls of all Five Tribes to children that were born
since the last deadline.257 This was to assure a uniform deadline among
the tribes, and Congress ordered equal allotment distributions among
those with new and legitimate citizenship claims.258
With the Commission’s work nearly finished, the enormity of the
allotment task became clear. To solicit enrollment applications, the Com-
mission wrote hundreds of thousands of letters and sent enrollment par-
ties into the Indian territories.259
The Commission had documented approximately 90,000 tribal
members out of a total population of 600,000 individuals by 1904.260 The
90,000 tribal members came out of 200,000 claimants, each requiring a
250. CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 8. R
251. Id.
252. Id. at 56.
253. Appropriation Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 982 (1903).
254. CFCT 1903, supra note 126, at 57. R
255. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 7. R
256. Id. at 17.
257. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 579. R
258. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 8. R
259. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 582 (“The Commission’s enrollment parties have R
visited every part of the Indian Territory, carrying its voluminous records and its extensive
camping paraphernalia into regions rarely if ever before visited by the white-man.”).
260. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 6. R
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long process with a potential appeal to Washington.261 For example out
of 24,634 claims from applicants for citizenship as Mississippi Choctaws,
the Commission rejected or dismissed 22,100 and only granted ten per-
cent status as tribal members.262 Eventually, the Commission’s work pro-
duced over 250,000 conveyances evidencing allotment titles, each
containing specific, detailed documentation of associated deeds and
patents.263
Despite the complexity and size of the allotment process, by 1904
the remaining tribes were ninety percent finished.264 A summary of the
allotment process lies in the annals of Congress:
In 1889 the Cherokee [Dawes] Commission was created for the
purpose of abolishing the tribal governments and opening the
territories to white settlement, with the result that after fifteen
years of negotiation an agreement was made by which the
government of the Cherokee nation came to a final end 3/3/
1906; the Indian lands were divided.265
The objectives for the Dawes Commission therefore included abolishing
tribal governments and opening Indian lands to white settlement, but
did not actually include statehood or even allotment.
The final cost of the federal allotment crusade was ten cents an
acre, or over two million dollars.266 The results of allotment were clear:
dissected tribal autonomy, and diminished tribal control over natural re-
sources. The Choctaws from Mississippi even had to live on their ex-
isting land parcels for three years before the allotment of land became
official.267 In 1905, the remaining Commissioner worked on the loose
ends of the allotment process, and concluded that “[m]any [Cherokee]
full-bloods were opposed to the allotment of land and failed or refused
to appear and select their allotments. It became necessary to arbitrarily
allot land to this class of citizens.”268 Illegal settlers and speculators were
still milling around at the time, and on March 3, 1905, Congress appro-
priated $15,000 dollars for the removal of settlers and intruders in Indian
261. Id.
262. Id. at 15. Reviews and appeals to the Secretary of the Interior slowed down the
process as well. Id. at 6.
263. CFCT 1906, supra note 93, at 61. R
264. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 7. R
265. H.R. Rep. No. 82-2503, supra note 23, at 269. R
266. CFCT 1904, supra note 21, at 6. R
267. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 39. R
268. Id. at 621.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\53-1\NMN102.txt unknown Seq: 38 11-APR-13 8:47
38 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 53
territories.269 The Commissioner exclaimed in his 1905 report that “what
is still to do—is but the gathering of fragments.”270 The only allotments
actually left to complete were those recent claims for newborns and mi-
nors.271 The Commission therefore closed the book on allotment when it
transferred authority in 1905 to the Secretary of the Interior, “to negotiate
agreements looking to dissolution of the tribal governments and the
transfer of land titles from the tribes as communities to the individual
Indians.”272 On April 26, 1906, Congress passed H.R. 5976, which allowed
the Department of the Interior to close an enrollment case, and stand by
the decision without any chance of future appeal.273 The destruction of
tribal autonomy and the diminishment and dispersal of tribal natural re-
sources were the final legacies of completed allotment.
The allotment story is a potent example that immigrant greed for
Indian natural resources was a pressing enough motivation to overtake
any obstacle, including sovereign governments. Even the Dawes Com-
mission members were not immune from the insatiable settler desire to
exploit Indian natural resources. Allotment exemptions included land for
town sites, churches, schools, and cemeteries; the Commission also made
allotment exemptions for railroad corporations, and coal, asphalt, oil,
gas, and mineral interests.274 For example, the Chickasaw and Choctaw
nations had 1,386,720 acres of their land exempted from allotment for a
forest reserve and another 507,607.95 acres exempt for other purposes.275
These exemptions totaled nearly twenty percent of the Chickasaw and
Choctaw tribal land.276 Several Dawes Commissioners also invested with
exploitative agents and speculators.277 Commissioners formed trust com-
panies that invested in, and leased, allotted lands, with the promise to
sell to oil or other natural resource companies.278 Other Commissioners
served as board members, attorneys, stockholders, or as executives of
companies that had interests in Indian natural resources.279 The Commis-
269. Ch. 1479, 43 Stat. 1060 (1905) (“An act making appropriations for the current and
contingent expenses of the Indian Department and for fulfilling treaty stipulations with
various Indian tribes for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and six,
and for other purposes.”).
270. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 35. R
271. CFCT 1907, supra note 125, at 5. Total Choctaw and Chickasaw area was R
11,660,952.35 acres. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 608. R
272. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 39. R
273. CFCT 1906, supra note 93, at 25. R
274. CFCT 1907, supra note 125, at 22. R
275. Id. at 21.
276. See id.
277. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 32, at 416. R
278. Id.
279. MINER, supra note 87, at 192. R
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sion even attempted to exempt pine timberlands from allotment, but was
instructed otherwise by the Secretary of the Interior on April 25, 1904.280
Unlike the Okmulgee proposal, which represented Indian defense
against non-native encroachment, the allotment story is one in which the
federal government used statehood as the latest rational to exploit Indian
natural resources and destroy tribal sovereignty. The Dawes Commis-
sion pressed tribal enrollment and allotments as the only path to Indian
self-determination, but the process only eroded collective tribal strength.
E. The Sequoyah Convention and the Last Chance for Statehood
Faced with the threat to tribal sovereignty and natural resources
represented by the Dawes Commission, leaders of the Five Tribes began
to organize defenses in the early twentieth century.281 By 1900, it was
clear that allotment and statehood would proceed in the Five Tribes’ ter-
ritories.282 The only question was whether the tribes could salvage the
situation by pressing for dual statehood, which could include a semi-
autonomous pan-Indian state. In May of 1903, leaders from the Five
Tribes met to discuss statehood for the first time since the Dawes Com-
mission and discussed plans for a pan-Indian state called Sequoyah.283
In the summer of 1905, tribal representatives met in Muscogee for
the Sequoyah Constitutional Convention.284 At the Convention, a Chero-
kee formally proposed a State of Sequoyah.285 Tribal officials worked to
formulate a plan for representation and a constitution.286 On August 21,
the Convention decided that the new State of Sequoyah would be split
into 48 counties with equal representation.287 Members of the Five Tribes
overwhelmingly voted to approve the proposal.288 Sequoyah representa-
tives submitted the proposal to Congress, but federal lawmakers never
considered it.289 Understanding the history of the Dawes Commission,
however, one could conclude that the Sequoyah proposal was a defense
280. CFCT 1905, supra note 196, at 31. R
281. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 173. The name Sequoyah originated in honor of the R
individual Sequoya, who invented the Cherokee alphabet in the 1820s. H.R. Rep. No. 82-
2503, supra note 23, at 268. R
282. Maxwell, supra note 90, at 173. R
283. Id.
284. Id. at 161.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. THEDA PERDUE, NATIONS REMEMBERED: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES 1865–1907, at 194 (1980).
288. See id.
289. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES 162–64 (Princeton Univ. Press 1972).
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mechanism against a single statehood idea that would have imbedded
the Five Tribes into a foreign state’s jurisdiction.290
Unfortunately by 1905, the settler population in the areas sur-
rounding the Five Tribes was so large and demanding that the cry for
single statehood was deafening.291 The larger immigrant population
could lobby and demand statehood with more force than representatives
from the Five Tribes.292
With control over tribal autonomy and Indian natural resources at
stake, there was little doubt that the federal government would prevail
in the statehood debate.293 Once Congress rejected Sequoyah and the Five
Tribes’ last attempt to salvage tribal sovereignty, it was only a matter of
time before single statehood for the territories passed.
In 1907, the federal Union admitted the State of Oklahoma as a
single state with jurisdiction over lands previously held by the Five
Tribes.294 The five tribal governments officially existed only until allot-
ment was complete.295 Within the year, the State of Oklahoma liquidated
and absorbed the Indian territory.296 Tribal members were now a part of
a state in which they were vastly outnumbered, and subject to legislation
conceived by immigrants and settlers.
The Indian population of Oklahoma at the time was just over five
percent of 1,414,177 people.297 The Seminoles, the smallest of the Five
Tribes, totaled only 2,138 individuals (including 986 freedmen) out of the
million and a half people in Oklahoma.298 Prospects for a pan-Indian
state completely disappeared. Although the federal government abro-
gated the allotment policy in the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, the
damage was done.299 Settlers and immigrants officially, and effectively,
290. Hodges, supra note 25, at 17. R
291. DEBO, supra note 289, at 159 (“Although statehood has represented the most ardent R
aspirations of every new American community, it is doubtful if any other people ever
longed for that magic goal with the intensity of the white inhabitants of the Indian Terri-
tory. A white population very much larger than that of any state at the time of its admis-
sion to the Union had been living under conditions of political dependence never
experienced before by a frontier settlement.”).
292. See id.
293. Amos Maxwell, The Sequoyah Convention Part II, 28 CHRON. OKLA., no. 3, 1950, at
333 (“[T]here is a natural law among men and nations that when one nation or people is
stronger than its neighbor the stronger will overwhelm the weaker. This natural law which
ignores all treaties was exemplified by Congress when it rejected the bid for statehood for
the proposed State of Sequoyah.”).
294. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 78, at 25. R
295. Id.
296. COLEMAN, supra note 148, at 62. R
297. DEBO, supra note 289, at 170. R
298. H.R. Rep. No. 82-2503, supra note 23. R
299. Indian Reorganization Act (1934), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006).
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destroyed the governments of the Five Tribes. In the process, Indian nat-
ural resources were fractioned, wasted, stolen, or lost.
F. American Indian Involvement Within Dominant Political Models
The United States government also attempted to create parallel
tribal institutions modeled after imported European political norms. The
United States Congress passed the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act
(“IRA”), and encouraged tribal self-government and the creation of tribal
constitutions modeled after the governmental framework adopted by the
settlers of America.300 As one commentator summarized, the IRA cen-
tered around reinvigorating tribal governments and “[t]hese arrange-
ments gave them a legal basis for civic organization comparable with
that of the white communities.”301 Tribes formed the National Congress
of American Indians (“NCAI”) in 1944 to address and advance tribal
treaty and sovereignty rights.302 Even then, however, the NCAI posi-
tioned itself as an independent body only to “monitor federal policy and
coordinate efforts to inform federal decisions that affect tribal govern-
ment interests.”303
Without the promise and control inherent in a pan-Indian state,
American Indian nations were reduced to semi-sovereign wards of the
federal government.304 American Indians received the right to vote and
had other full citizenship rights in 1924.305 Still, the right to vote does not
necessarily lead to collective action let alone aggregate impact, so Ameri-
can Indians have attempted to influence the debates over self-govern-
ance and natural resources through election to office in the federal
government itself.306
300. Id. at 148; A. GRENFELL PRICE, WHITE SETTLERS AND NATIVE PEOPLES 45, 46 (1972).
301. PRICE, supra note 300, at 45. R
302. Mission and History, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, http://www.
ncai.org/about-ncai/mission-history (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
303. NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, 2007–2008 NCAI ANNUAL REPORT: 65TH ANNI-
VERSARY - PROTECTING SOVEREIGNTY IN THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 4 (2008), available at
http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncai-publications/ncai-annual-reports/2008_NCAI_An-
nual_Report.pdf.
304. See generally FLERAS & ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 149–60. R
305. Id. at 149.
306. For example, Osage Charles Curtis was elected to the House of Representatives in
1892 and to the Senate in 1906. WILLIAM E. UNRAU, MIXED-BLOODS AND TRIBAL DISSOLUTION:
CHARLES CURTIS AND THE QUEST FOR INDIAN IDENTITY 9–10 (Univ. Press of Kansas, 1989);
Charles Curtis, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, http://bioguide.con-
gress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C001008 (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). Lakota Sioux
Benjamin Reifel also served in the House of Representatives from 1961 to 1971 Benjamin
Reifel, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.
gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000152 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012), and Cheyenne Ben
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\53-1\NMN102.txt unknown Seq: 42 11-APR-13 8:47
42 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 53
American Indians also utilize the lobbying process to influence
federal decision makers. The federal government helped create the NCAI
in 1944 as part of a federal and Indian consultation process pursuant to
the IRA.307 This Congress eventually served as a lobbying forum for In-
dian interests, e.g. lobbying against the American “termination” policy.308
Recent accounts of Indian lobbying efforts also make clear that tribes
often heavily utilize the lobbying arm in an attempt to influence federal
policy.309
Whether through suffrage, election into the government, or lobby-
ing efforts, American Indians have found a variety of ways to participate
directly in the dominant political institutions and models without the
benefits of absolute sovereignty or even statehood within a federal
model. Each one of these coping strategies represents some degree of
American Indians succumbing to imported political norms, but also rep-
resents affirmative use of an imposed political system to advance Ameri-
can Indian interests. The balance of power that results directs and
impacts the debate over the allocation, and protection, of American In-
dian natural resource holdings.
American Indian efforts to preserve sovereignty and control over
natural resources through statehood efforts or other forms of participa-
tion in the dominant political framework are not isolated examples of
native coping and survival strategies in the face of immigrant pressure.
Although the scope of this article does not extend to a comprehensive
review of such efforts by indigenous people across the world, comparing
the American Indian experience with that of the Maoris in New Zealand
can provide an illustrative example of the commonalities that native
communities face when their natural resources are under pressure or at
risk.310 Both American Indians and Maoris were fairly isolated geograph-
ically, until European settlers arrived hungry for new land and natural
resources. American Indians had to adapt to a federal representative sys-
tem, whereas Maoris had to adjust to monarchy and parliamentary mod-
els. Despite these differences, the coping and survival strategies utilized
by Indians and Maoris in the face of natural resource threats are remark-
ably similar.
Nighthorse Campbell was in the House of Representatives and Senate from 1987–2005, Ben
Nighthorse Campbell, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bi-
oguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000077 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
307. FLERAS & ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 153. R
308. See id.
309. See Michael Janofsky, Senate Opens Hearings on Lobbyists for Tribes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2004, at A26.
310. Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 1. R
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III. MAORI ACCEPTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN MODEL
Prior to the English arrival in what is now New Zealand, Maori
tribal communities also existed as sovereign and independent nations.
These tribes exercised internal control over their politics, society, eco-
nomics, and natural resources, but when the demand from English set-
tlers for Maori natural resources increased, the independence of Maori
tribes was at risk.311 This led to land wars between the English and Maori
tribes, and a Maori “King Movement” modeled on English norms and
designed to maintain the independent and sovereign status of Maori
communities. Maoris also sought the right to vote and participated di-
rectly in the legal system imported from England. These offensive and
defensive survival strategies show how Maoris utilize imported legal
and political norms to protect their natural resources and independence.
A. The Evolution of Maori Political Institutions and Models
Maori dissatisfaction with their political representation in the set-
tler or Pakeha government led to a movement for Maori statehood soon
after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between England and the
Maoris on February 6, 1840. In doing so, a significant portion of the Ma-
ori people attempted to challenge the New Zealand government on its
own terms by adopting English governmental norms and applying them
to an independence movement.
1. The Maori King Movement and Land Wars
Several tribes banded together to elect the Waikato Maori Chief Te
Wherowhero as a Maori King in 1858. The allied tribes subsequently cre-
ated a flag, a council of state, a code of laws, and a police force.312 Indeed,
from 1865 until 1881 the Maori of “King Country” operated as an autono-
mous polity that was beyond the control of the colonists.313 While this
“King Movement” represented a challenge to the New Zealand govern-
ment itself, it was also a tacit acceptance of the European model of gov-
ernment. European political norms essentially were grafted onto the
existing Maori institution of the tribe or assembly.314
According to one nineteenth century observer, the king move-
ment represented a Maori “desire” and “pining” for a “separate national-
311. JOAN METGE, THE MAORIS OF NEW ZEALAND 25–26, 29–36 (2nd ed. 1976).
312. Id. at 33; CLAUDIA ORANGE, THE STORY OF A TREATY 46 (1989).
313. PETER SPILLER ET AL., A NEW ZEALAND LEGAL HISTORY 133 (1996).
314. KAYLEEN M. HAZLEHURST, POLITICAL EXPRESSION AND ETHNICITY: STATECRAFT AND
MOBILISATION IN THE MAORI WORLD 5, 7 (1993); G.L. PEARCE, THE STORY OF THE MAORI PEO-
PLE 69 (1972).
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ity.”315 Another contemporaneous commentator concluded that the
naming of a Maori king was “a simple step” towards the formation of an
“independent nation” for Maoris.316 The peace promised by the Treaty of
Waitangi had come at the cost of Maori independence. The King Move-
ment thus arose in response to the failures inherent in the Treaty of
Waitangi, according to this same observer:
Governor Hobson inaugurated British rule by the so called
Treaty of Waitangi, by which some of the tribes ceded the sov-
ereignty and right of pre-emption over all the lands in the
country. If the treaty made by some of the independent states
was ever binding on the whole, it was allowed to lapse from
want of power to enforce it, and it is now totally repudiated
by the tribes who have declared their independence, generally
on the pretexts that they never consented to it, and that it has
never been enforced.317
In short, one Maori summarized at the time how the purpose of the king
movement was to “preserve [Maori] sovereignty.”318 But when private
Pakeha individuals drafted a Maori language petition to the Queen in
1860, they described the King Movement as an “experiment” and dis-
avowed any attempt to challenge the Crown’s “sovereignty.”319 Maori
representatives, however, refused to adopt and sign the petition.320 Al-
though the Maori had modeled the King Movement after English politi-
cal norms, the Maori viewed the “King Movement” as a way to preserve
sovereignty and control over their own destinies.
The King Movement, therefore, was the Maori response to a sys-
tem of governance in New Zealand that was purely imported and that
did not allow for Maori to have a political voice.321 The lack of Maori
control over natural resources, like water, was particularly sensitive. In-
deed, the rise in Maori political protest activity beginning in the 1860s
315. James Edward Fitzgerald, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives of
New Zealand: The Native Policy of New Zealand (Aug. 6, 1862) (transcript available at the
Alexander Turnbull Library, National Library of New Zealand, Te Puna Matauranga o
Aotearoa, Wellington, N.Z.).
316. CAPTAIN J.C. JOHNSTONE, THE MAORIES AND THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT ANARCHY
IN NEW ZEALAND 10 (1861) (on file as part of “Pamphlets, Vol. 20,” with the Alexander
Turnbull Library, National Library of New Zealand, Te Puna Matauranga o Aotearoa,
Wellington).
317. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis in original).
318. Id. at 12 (quoting testimony of Waata Kukutai to the Waikato Committee, without
further citation).
319. Id. at 37–39.
320. Id.
321. PEARCE, supra note 314, at 68–69. R
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directly related to the Crown’s assertion of absolute title over water re-
sources.322 As such, an underlying cause of the King Movement was im-
migrant pressure on natural resources that previously were ample for
all.323 Maori discomfort with the New Zealand government and the legal
imposition of European land tenure ideals only increased after a Land
Court created by the immigrants began to allocate grants to Maori
land.324
Land wars between Maoris and the New Zealand government
soon followed from 1863 to 1872.325 These land wars were characterized
by an 1864 edition of the London Times as “a war of sovereignty.”326 Some
reform subsequently occurred with the 1867 Maori Representation Act,
when the New Zealand government provided Maori males with suffrage
that was not dependant on holding title to land and dedicated four Ma-
ori seats in Parliament.327 The 1867 Act acknowledged that the property
qualification effectively disenfranchised the Maori:
[O]wing to the peculiar nature of the tenure of Maori land and
to other causes the Native Aboriginal inhabitants of this Col-
ony of New Zealand have heretofore with few exceptions been
unable to become registered as electors or to vote at the elec-
tion of members of the House of Representatives or of the Pro-
vincial Councils of the said Colony.328
On a broader scale, however, New Zealand continued to move away
from any political model that would accommodate pluralism or varying
degrees of sovereignty, including any Maori political or legal self-deter-
mination. New Zealand eliminated provincial governments in 1876, ex-
emplifying a pattern favoring centralism over localism.329
322. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM’N, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI AND MAORI FISHERIES:
MATAITAI — NGA TIKANGA MAORI ME TE TIRITI O WAITANGI, PRELIMINARY PAPER NO. 9, at
147 (1989).
323. Id. at 152.
324. Id.
325. Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi—Competing Views, in TE REO O TE TIRITI
MAI RANO: THE TREATY IS ALWAYS SPEAKING 18–19 (Bernard Kernot & Alistair McBride eds.,
1989) [hereinafter Treaty of Waitangi] (quoting 1864 London Times without additional
citation).
326. Id.
327. See generally Maori Representation Act 1867, (N.Z.); accord. METGE, supra note 311, R
at 4; Constitution Room Exhibit, New Zealand National Archives, Wellington.
328. Maori Representation Act of 1867, supra note 327, at Preamble. R
329. Constitution Room Exhibit, supra note 327, at 152. R
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2. The Kotahitanga and Maori Councils
The Maoris continued to pursue a greater degree of self-determi-
nation despite the increasing dominance of a central New Zealand sover-
eign, modeling independent legal and political regimes after the
dominant European style framework. Representatives of tribes outside
the King Movement met annually during the 1880s to organize petitions
to the New Zealand government for separate Maori civil institutions.330
When the New Zealand government rejected their requests, the tribes
outside the King Movement set up an independent Maori Parliament
called the Kotahitanga.331 The King Movement had evolved into a move-
ment that included a parliamentary body with the creation in 1894 of this
“Kingitanga’s Kauhanganui” or “Great Council” that was empowered to
pass laws and impose taxes and fines.332
The Kotahitanga relied on the 1835 “Declaration of Independence”
as the source for the Maori right to autonomous action.333 The
Kotahitanga was modeled on the Pakeha General Assembly, with electo-
ral districts, an upper and lower house, and formal debating.334 In part
due to Maori dissatisfaction with the New Zealand government’s land
policies, the Maori Kotahitanga and Kauhanganui Parliaments began en-
acting their own legislation relating to natural resources, like land, in the
1890s.335 Complaints relating to water resources also pervaded Maori po-
litical protest activity during the latter part of the nineteenth century.336
The Kotahitanga met for eleven years, and disbanded in 1902 only after
the New Zealand government passed legislation establishing local Maori
Councils.337 As some Maori advocates contend, however, the Maori
Councils Act was part of an effort to defeat Maori self-determination by
making the Maori Parliament or Kotahitanga obsolete.338
Although the modern New Zealand government allows Maori
tribes limited roles in administering governmental services, the govern-
ment firmly rejects that this concession will ever lead to “parallel institu-
330. METGE, supra note 311, at 36.
331. Id. at 47; accord. ORANGE, supra note 312, at 67. R
332. METGE, supra note 311, at 47; ORANGE, supra note 312, at 67; SPILLER ET AL., supra R
note 313, at 155. R
333. Orange, supra note 325, at 22. R
334. Tim McCreanor, The Treaty of Waitangi: Responses and Responsibilities, in HONOUR-
ING THE TREATY: AN INTRODUCTION FOR PAKEHA TO THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 43 (Helen Yen-
sen, Kevin Hague, & Tim McCreanor eds., 1989).
335. SPILLER ET AL., supra note 313, at 128.
336. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM’N, supra note 322, at 147–53. R
337. METGE, supra note 311, at 36.
338. Tania Rangiheuea, The Role of Maori Women in Treaty Negotiations and Settlements, in
TREATY SETTLEMENTS: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 105.
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tions.”339 Nevertheless, some representatives of Maori interests continue
to argue that governmental policies affecting Maoris should be formu-
lated by Maoris or that any legislation impacting Maori interests should
receive Maori approval prior to adoption, and continue to propose new
governmental arrangements that would accommodate a “Maori Parlia-
ment,” a “Maori House within Parliament,” a “Maori/Pakeha Senate,” or
a “National Maori Assembly.”340
B. Maori Participation Within Dominant Political Institutions and
Models
Maoris have attempted to influence public policy affecting Maori
natural resources by creating independence movements that paralleled
European political institutions and models, e.g. Maoris’ pursuit of the
King Movement and the Kotahitanga as independent Maori governing
bodies. The failure of the King and Kotahitanga movements represented
a lesson that the only effective way to deal with immigrant pressure on
Maori natural resources was to learn how to influence the imported legal
system.”341
The first step toward Maori participation within the dominant po-
litical process in New Zealand was suffrage. Maori interests within the
existing European-style political framework received some assurance of
representation when Maoris received four parliamentary seats in l867.342
That year, Maori males also received a right to vote that did not depend
on the ownership of land and similar suffrage for Maori women began in
1893.343 By 1894 one of the Maori Members of Parliament (MPs) had in-
troduced a “Native Rights Bill” calling for the creation of a separate Ma-
ori constitution and a formal Maori legislature to enact laws relating to
the Maori.344 Therefore, beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Ma-
ori attempted both to emulate European-style political and legal institu-
tions with parallel, independent institutions and to work within the
339. Compare FLERAS & ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 207, with Honorable Douglas Graham,
Address by the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, in TREATY SETTLEMENTS:
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 146.
340. M.H. Durie, Proceedings of a Hui at Hirangi Marae, Turangi, in TREATY SETTLEMENTS:
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 26.
341. HAZLEHURST, supra note 314, at 6.
342. See generally Maori Representation Act of 1867, supra note 327; The Electoral Act of
1893, 33–83, at §§ 148–56 (New Zealand.).
343. The Maori Representation Act of 1897, supra note 327; accord. METGE, supra note R
311, at 36; ABOUT NEW ZEALAND, PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND PROTOCOL DIVISION, NEW ZEALAND R
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE 3 (1995).
344. SPILLER ET AL., supra note 313, at 155.
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existing European-style institutions by engaging in the imported political
process as official representatives or via the right to vote.
In the 1920s, the Ratana church established a political party ca-
tering to Maori interests like statutory ratification of the Treaty of
Waitangi.345 By the 1943 election, Ratana members held all four of the
Maori parliamentary seats.346 The Ratana effort was the first indication
that the Maori could constitute a significant political force within the
confines of the New Zealand democratic model.347
From 1979 through 1980, the first meetings occurred of the “Mana
Maori Motuhake” party, also known as the Maori Self-Determination
Party.348 This party was not centered around a Maori independence
movement, but represented an attempt to provide a uniquely Maori po-
litical platform for interests that traditionally had been subsumed within
the Labour Party.349 At this point, Maori political representatives had ac-
cepted the larger framework of imported parliamentary authority and
stopped emulating European political models through parallel institu-
tions.350 The Party essentially acknowledged the utility of imported legal
forms, and hoped that a stronger Maori presence in bureaucracies and
government agencies would make the New Zealand government more
representative and responsive to Maori concerns.351 This legacy has car-
ried on, as political parties centered on Maori interests continue to exist
today in New Zealand.352
Beginning in 1993, the government began to calculate the dedi-
cated Maori seats on the same population basis as other seats.353 The Pub-
lic Affairs and Protocol Division of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign
345. ORANGE, supra note 312, at 71. R
346. Id. at 71.
347. Interview with Douglas Graham, Minister of Justice and Minister in Charge of
Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, Bronwyn Arthur, Crown Law Attorney, Margaret
Dugdale, Team Manager for Policy/Negotiations with the Office of Treaty Settlements, and
Lauren Perry, Minister Graham’s Private Legal Secretary in Wellington, N.Z. (April 15,
1997) [hereinafter Graham Interview]. New Zealand’s Minister of Justice contends that one
of the weaknesses of the dedicated Maori seat system is that the seats always have been
occupied by members of the same party, and because of strong party discipline individual
legislators have never exercised any true political independence. Id. According to Minister
Graham, the existence of dedicated Maori seats allows other politicians the luxury of avoid-
ing championing a Maori perspective on issues affecting the Maori based on an under-
standing that legislators occupying dedicated Maori seats will account for any Maori
concerns. Id.
348. HAZLEHURST, supra note 314, at 62. R
349. See id. at 68–69.
350. See id. at 75.
351. Id. at 75.
352. See MAORI PARTY, (2010), http://www.maoriparty.org.
353. Graham Interview, supra note 347. R
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Affairs and Trade neatly summarized the Maori role in this form of par-
liamentary democracy as of 1995:
There are currently 99 members of Parliament (MPS), who are
all elected. Four of these are Maori MPs representing the
mixed populations of general electorates [and] are also of Ma-
ori descent. Citizens of Maori heritage choose whether to reg-
ister on the Maori or the General roll of electors, and may
change their registration from time to time.354
As of 1996, however, representation of Maori interests in New Zealand
changed dramatically.
New Zealand eliminated its majority rule system in 1993, and on
October 12, 1996, New Zealand held its first election based on a new
voting system under the “mixed-member proportional representation
method” (MMP).355 This method provides minority parties with a larger
governmental voice and opens the door to coalition governments:
Under the MMP, each voter has two votes: one is for the party
preferred to win [the] government for a three year term; the
other is the choice of a local representative in a parliament ex-
pected to swell to 120 seats from 99. The party vote alone de-
termines which parties have the numbers to form a
government, and each party’s relative power within the
coalition.356
A Royal Commission in turn concluded that the dedicated Maori seats
should be abolished because the MMP system would lead to greater op-
position and minority political representation.357 Despite these findings
and his personal reservations about the dedicated seats, the former New
Zealand Minister of Justice concluded that the Maori seats were still ben-
eficial on balance and should only be eliminated if Maoris agreed to such
a change by registering on the general electoral role.358 In recent times,
approximately fifty percent of Maori voters have registered on the gen-
354. Id.
355. S. Karene Witcher, New Zealand Politics Turn Tumultuous: New Voting System May
Bring Discord, Harm Economy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1996, at A18.
356. Id.; accord. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE supra note 343, R
at 17; Interview with Margaret Dugdale, Team Manager for Policy/Negotiations, Office of
Treaty Settlements, and Bronwyn Arthur, Attorney, Crown Law, in Wellington, N.Z. (April
15, 1997) [hereinafter Dugdale Interview].
357. Witcher, supra note 355. R
358. Id.
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eral electoral role, with the other fifty percent of Maori voters registered
on the Maori role.359
The 1993 electoral reforms have aided Maori political representa-
tion. There were five dedicated Maori seats by 1997.360 Furthermore, New
Zealand was a two party country from the 1930s until the early 1990s,
but with the onset of MMP many parties emerged.361 The MMP system
therefore opened the door for a greater small political party role, includ-
ing those catering to Maori concerns. The New Zealand government
summarizes that “MMP offers an opportunity for a range of parties to
gain seats by achieving at least five percent of the party vote.”362 In the-
ory, this allows for a greater governmental role for Maoris.363 Indeed, the
importance of the MMP change and the possibility of increased Maori
representation in Parliament is magnified by New Zealand’s single
chamber Parliament system as any concentration of parliamentary
power is not diluted by balancing powers of other representative bod-
ies.364 But in any case, Maoris have largely accepted the parliamentary
system and now work within the larger New Zealand political party
framework.
C. Maori Political Participation and Sovereignty
Maoris also have to be creative to maintain control over their nat-
ural resource assets. Governmental norms brought by colonists have al-
lowed for immigrant encroachment on Maori natural resources, but
these same legal constructs often provide Maoris with options to mini-
mize the negative impacts of an imposed government. These issues came
to a head during the Maori King Movement and the push for a
Kotahitanga.365 Settlers sought broader state jurisdiction, but Maori lead-
ers maximized opportunities to control their natural resources and sov-
359. Id.
360. Dugdale Interview, supra note 356. R
361. Id.
362. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 343, at 17. R
363. Compare HIWI TAUROA, HEALING THE BREACH: ONE MAORI’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE
TREATY OF WAITANGI 96 (1989) (quoting Justice Wallace, Chairman of the Human Rights
Commission, Royal Commission on the Electoral System), with HONOURING THE TREATY 124
(Helen Yensen, Kevin Hague & Tim McCreanor eds., 1989) (“[a]t best, if all Maori people
voted for the same Maori party, something that would never be expected of Pakeha, Maori
could gain ten to twelve per cent [sic] of the seats in Parliament.”).
364. Witcher, supra note 355, at A18 (New Zealand’s “upper house” of parliament was R
abolished in 1950); PAUL TEMM, THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL: THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION
111 (1990).
365. See supra Part III.A.
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ereignty.366 When those efforts petered out, Maoris immersed themselves
in the imported legal norms by obtaining the right to vote, fielding Maori
candidates for election, and lobbying the New Zealand government di-
rectly.367 As with the American Indian experience, all of these survival
strategies have included efforts to advance Maori interests in natural re-
source allocation and protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Again, this article is premised on two assumptions. First, the his-
tory of relationships between indigenous peoples and settlers largely
represents a battle for control over natural resources. Second, control
over such resources is a foundation for both economic and political self-
determination. Because control over natural resources is so important,
indigenous people have utilized a wide range of coping strategies to pre-
serve their rights. One such strategy seeks greater participation by indig-
enous people within the imported legal construct in an effort to maintain
political and economic independence. Both American Indian and Maori
communities have sought to maintain sovereignty and to protect their
natural resource rights through formal statehood movements, and other
direct participation within the imported political framework. From suf-
frage, to fielding candidates, to creating political parties, to utilizing the
lobbying process, indigenous peoples have engaged in creative efforts to
preserve their natural resource rights through direct participation in im-
ported legal and political frameworks. And in doing so, indigenous peo-
ple have used imported norms as both a defensive shield and offensive
sword in the fight for native sovereignty.
Ultimately, the history of relations between the United States fed-
eral government and the Five Tribes reveals that onslaughts on tribal
sovereignty were motivated by immigrant desires for Indian natural re-
sources. From removal to the Dawes Commission, Indian nations like the
Five Tribes have faced renewed attacks on tribal autonomy when their
natural resources were most valuable to the surrounding settlers, yet In-
dians have fought back within the immigrants’ own legal system.
American Indians must be creative to protect their natural re-
source assets. Imported governmental norms can rationalize or legiti-
mize the amount and takings of American Indian natural resources.
However, the same legal norms often afford American Indians certain
entitlements, rights, and protections, and can be deployed defensively or
offensively to mitigate the negative impacts of an imposed legal system.
366. Id.
367. See supra Part III.B.
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These dynamics all came to bear in the debates over American Indian
statehood and the alternative that became the State of Oklahoma. Settlers
used the statehood concept to demand the fractionalization and division
of tribal assets and to subsume Indian holdings to a dominant state and
jurisdiction, whereas American Indian leaders used the opportunity to
advocate for a pan-Indian state as one path to maximize Indian sover-
eignty and control over natural resources. Exposed in the process was
the quintessential connection between the need for control over natural
resources and the perpetration of native sovereignty. Without a consoli-
dated land and natural resource base, American Indian statehood propo-
nents ultimately could not justify or explain the practical implementation
of a dedicated pan-Indian state. As American Indians lost control over
the statehood debate, they simultaneously lost control over vast natural
resource holdings. Just a few years later Oklahoma was the next state in
the union, and immigrants and settlers controlled huge swaths of natural
resource holdings formerly held by American Indian tribes or tribal
members. Still, American Indians eventually tried to manipulate the im-
ported legal norms for their benefit by obtaining the right to influence
the political process directly through voting rights, fielding Indian candi-
dates for elective office, and lobbying the federal government directly on
matters of interest to Indian tribes. All of these coping strategies in-
cluded efforts to advance American Indian interests in the allocation and
protection of natural resources.
Similarly, Maori participation in the New Zealand government
also reflects attempts to preserve native sovereignty and natural resource
rights in a monarchy and parliamentary context. The King Movement
and the Kotahitanga were efforts by Maoris to adopt increasingly domi-
nant imported legal norms to protect their land and other resources. As
true Maori movements for independence and sovereignty floundered,
Maoris also switched gears and began participating within the dominant
political institutions and models through the Ratana Party, the Maori
Self-Determination Party, through elected Maori Representatives in Par-
liament, and through the direct right to vote. Each of these Maori politi-
cal and legal efforts occurred during times when an imported population
sought to erode Maori natural resource rights.
So again, the history of relations between the New Zealand gov-
ernment and the Maori underscores that attacks on tribal independence
were driven by an immigrant thirst for Maori natural resources. From
the Treaty of Waitangi to the Maori Self-Determination Party, Maori
tribes faced increasing assaults on tribal sovereignty when their natural
resources were most attractive to the encroaching immigrants—but
again have protected themselves through the settlers’ own political
norms.
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Nevertheless, direct political participation by indigenous people
within a dominant legal and governmental system is not necessarily the
most effective strategy in fighting for native sovereignty or natural re-
source control. Because there are so many players and special interests
participating directly in the process, the agenda of indigenous people
tends to get lost in the shuffle as a minority background debate. Indige-
nous people just do not have the critical population mass necessary to
dominate or lead through the right to vote, lobbying, or other forms of
direct political involvement. Moreover, relying on direct political partici-
pation alone borders on total acquiescence.
So sometimes, indigenous people need to challenge the dominant
system through the judicial process or any other means necessary to
press the twin goals of native sovereignty and control over natural re-
sources. Failure to remain vigilant and active in the courts, however,
puts collective or tribal natural resource holdings at risk and in the pro-
cess undermines ongoing efforts toward indigenous self-determination.
Absent a massive boom in the population of indigenous peoples, direct
political participation in legislative efforts or public policy debates is not
enough and needs to be complemented by a judicial strategy. By taking
advantage of and even exploiting dominant governmental and legal
norms imported by colonists through a variety of survival strategies, in-
digenous people have the best chance of controlling their collective as-
sets and political future.
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